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THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF USING DISABILITY LAW 
AS A TOOL FOR SCHOOL REFORM 
Claire Raj* 
Abstract: Advocates have recently devised a radical litigation approach to force broad 
systemic changes in public schools using the most unlikely of tools: disability law. If they 
succeed, disability law stands to eclipse any other cause of action as the most effective means 
of school reform. This novel approach relies on groundbreaking research demonstrating a 
correlation between Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) that children encounter outside 
school and the learning challenges they face in school. Focusing on this link, advocates claim 
that children from impoverished and crime-ridden neighborhoods, by virtue of where they live, 
have disabilities that entitle them to system-wide school remedies under federal law. 
While this litigation exposes the depth of student need in high-poverty communities, the 
strategy is legally flawed and risks under-explored collateral consequences. Although 
advocates are correct that many of these children warrant individual remedies, using disability 
law to achieve system-wide educational reform is both unwise and unfeasible. First, such 
claims falsely assume that schools must identify all students who have any type of disability, 
when in fact schools’ substantive duties are limited to those students whose disabilities require 
special education or related services to ensure meaningful access to education. Second, 
disability law mandates services that meet individual students’ needs. Claims seeking school-
wide programmatic changes for all students are simply not legally required. Finally, classifying 
entire communities as disabled is over-inclusive and has the potential to stigmatize, albeit 
unfairly, all impoverished minority children as impaired. 
This Article proposes a more nuanced litigation strategy and a broader legislative agenda. 
First, advocates should use schools’ obligations to individual ACEs-impacted students to force 
schools to adopt more effective early identification processes. Schools should not assume all 
children have a disability, but identify those who do earlier. Second, federal and state 
legislation should provide targeted grants to schools that serve a high percentage of students 
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INTRODUCTION 
America’s public schools are overtasked, under-resourced, and 
increasingly responsible for educating large communities of students with 
unmet physical, medical, and psychological needs.1 While federal 
programs exist to address some of these concerns, thus far, these programs 
have proven insufficient to fully remediate the considerable challenges 
facing public schools.2 Advocates are now attempting a creative and 
radical litigation strategy to force broad-based changes in public schools. 
And, they are using the most unlikely of tools—disability rights laws.3 If 
they succeed, disability rights laws stand to eclipse any other cause of 
action as a means of school reform.4 But before diving over this precipice, 
                                                     
1. ULRICH BOSER, PERPETUAL BAFFOUR & STEPH VELA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A LOOK AT 
THE EDUCATION CRISIS: TESTS, STANDARDS, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 5 (Jan. 
2016), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/21075127/TUDAreport.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QPS2-8PKH] (“While there has been substantial progress over the past decade—
particularly in cities and states that have embraced standards-based reform—the nation still faces a 
pressing education crisis, particularly when it comes to students of color and students from low-
income backgrounds.”); see, e.g., S. EDUC. FOUND., A NEW MAJORITY: LOW INCOME STUDENTS 




2. In fact, current federal funds constitute less than 10% of overall education spending. STEPHEN 
Q. CORNMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR 
2015) 4–5 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018301.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBF6-2WH7]; see 
generally BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A 
NATIONAL REPORT CARD (2010), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxtYmwryVI00U2doWDhYUD
N6Ylk/view [https://perma.cc/BF2T-HFSE] (noting that funding levels nationally are well below 
levels necessary for low-income students to achieve above-average outcomes); Joel Klein, The 
Failure of American Schools, ATLANTIC (June 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archiv
e/2011/06/the-failure-of-american-schools/308497/ [https://perma.cc/8CNA-PLRX] (“[T]he gains 
we have made in improving our schools are negligible—even though we have doubled our spending 
(in inflation-adjusted dollars) on K-12 public education.”). 
3. Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 29, 2018); P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
4. Currently, no general federal constitution cause of action for school reform exists because the 
Supreme Court rejected education as a fundamental right. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection 
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). 
Other federal claims with the potential for systemic relief, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–2000d-7 (2012), and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 
U.S.C. § 1681–88 (2012), require plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination in order to win relief—
a burden few have managed to overcome. Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of 
Action: The Court’s Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally 
Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358 (2008). Finally, while systemic claims for reform are generally 
available under education clauses in state constitutions, those rights are perpetually difficult to 
enforce. William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of 
the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1185 (2003). 
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two crucial questions should be answered: (1) can advocates use disability 
rights laws as agents of systemic educational reform?; and (2) should they? 
The effort to leverage disability rights laws for school reform is rooted 
in groundbreaking research on Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs).5 
ACEs refer to specific categories of adversity—physical and emotional 
abuse, neglect, and household dysfunction—that are strongly correlated 
with poor long-term health outcomes.6 While ACEs are quite common 
and transcend socio-economic status, children raised in communities of 
poverty are more likely to be exposed to multiple and persistent ACEs, 
including food insecurity, lack of stable housing, and community 
violence.7 New research exploring ACEs links these experiences to wide-
ranging challenges that impede a student’s ability to learn, including 
difficulty regulating emotions, outsized anxiety or fear, and delayed 
executive functioning skills.8 
Public education advocates are creatively weaving this research into 
legal claims for systemic educational reform. Relying on ACEs research, 
they argue that children from impoverished and crime-ridden 
neighborhoods are individuals with disabilities due to the impacts of 
chronic poverty and community violence.9 As such, they argue these 
students should be entitled to supports and accommodations that ensure 
equal access to education.10 More specifically, they argue that disability 
rights laws require public schools in these communities to make systemic 
programmatic changes to address the disability-related needs of these 
                                                     
5. See, e.g., Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction 
to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 
14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245 (1998). 
6. Id. 
7. CHILD TRENDS, ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES (Mar. 7, 2019), [hereinafter CHILD 
TRENDS] https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/adverse-experiences [https://perma.cc/Y7QB-
JW3E] (analyzing data from the National Survey of Children’s Health 2011–2016, and concluding 
that “[p]oor children and near-poor children are more than twice as likely than [sic] their more affluent 
peers to have had three of more other adverse experiences”); see also Gary W. Evans & Pilyoung 
Kim, Childhood Poverty, Chronic Stress, Self-Regulation, and Coping, 7 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 43–48 
(2013) (discussing how children growing up in poverty are more likely to “experience a greater array 
of physical and psychosocial stressors,” including family conflict and turmoil and exposure to 
violence). 
8. Ron Hertel & Mona M. Johnson, How the Traumatic Experiences of Students Manifest in School 
Settings, in SUPPORTING AND EDUCATING TRAUMATIZED STUDENTS: A GUIDE FOR SCHOOL-BASED 
PROFESSIONALS 23–47 (Eric Rossen & Robert Hull eds., 2013). 
9. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian 
Educ., (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-08004-SPL) [hereinafter Stephen C. Complaint]; Class 
Action Complaint, P.P. v. Compton Unified School Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal May, 18, 
2015) (No. LA CV15 3726 MWF (PLAX)) [hereinafter P.P. Complaint]. 
10. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 12; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 72. 
 
14 - Raj (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/23/2020  11:34 AM 
2019] DISABILITY LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM 1835 
 
students.11 These include changes to curriculum (teaching social-
emotional learning skills), discipline (developing non-punitive restorative 
justice practices), and mental health support (offering access to school-
based counseling).12 
While these specific programmatic reforms may be both effective and 
grounded in evidence-based practices, it is far from clear that disability 
law requires these changes. Moreover, expanding disability categories to 
include entire communities of children creates the potential for other 
societal harms. In other words, disability rights statutes may not be the 
correct salve for these particular wounds. 
No court has yet determined whether exposure to ACEs, or the 
likelihood of such exposure, qualifies as a bona fide disability under any 
of the disability rights statutes: the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), 
or Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).13 At the core of 
each law is the right to supports—special education, accommodations, 
and other related services—when necessary to ensure that children with 
disabilities have access to the same curricula as their non-disabled peers.14 
The trouble with the new litigation strategy is that while children impacted 
by ACEs could theoretically access protections under all three laws, their 
ability to do so will solely depend on individual experience with ACEs 
and resulting needs.15 
Demonstrating a class claim based on exposure to ACEs is precarious 
at best because of the individualized nature of impacted children’s 
experiences and needs.16 First, all three laws situate both students’ rights 
and schools’ obligations in the context of an individual child, not groups 
of children.17 The IDEA, for instance, restricts eligibility to thirteen 
categories of disability and requires a child to demonstrate that the 
disability adversely affects his or her educational performance and results 
in a need for special education services.18 While a student impacted by 
ACEs could potentially fit into one of the IDEA’s disability categories, 
                                                     
11. See, e.g., Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 3–13; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 4; 61–
71, 192–223. 
12. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 62–64. 
13. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2018); 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12213. 
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
15. See infra section II.B. 
16. See infra section II.B. 
17. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019) (Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)); id. § 300.320 
(defining the Individualized Education Program (IEP)). 
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (defining children’s disabilities)  
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many students suffering from the effects of ACEs will likely need mental 
health supports, but not necessarily special education services.19 Without 
a need for specialized instruction, the IDEA becomes inaccessible to 
students impacted by ACEs. Section 504 and the ADA present similar, 
albeit distinct, problems. 
Section 504 and the ADA define disability in much broader terms.20 
Those broader terms could make individual students impacted by ACEs 
eligible for legal protections. Yet, leveraging these laws for systemic relief 
is tenuous. The most a class can claim is probable exposure to ACEs.21 
But Section 504 and the ADA—just like the IDEA—require 
individualized eligibility determinations before schools are obligated to 
provide special education or other supports.22 Crucially, knowledge that a 
child lives in chronic poverty and has exposure to ACEs does not, alone, 
trigger a right to special education services or accommodations under 
either law.23 
Second, these class action claims make false assumptions about 
schools’ affirmative duties to identify students suspected of having 
disabilities. While disability law requires schools to affirmatively seek out 
children suspected of having a disability and in need of special 
education—known as “child find” obligations—schools are simply not 
obligated to identify all children with disabilities in all cases.24 Rather, 
child find obligations are limited to identifying a subset of students with 
disabilities—those whose disabilities impact their education and require 
special education, accommodations, or other related services.25 In other 
words, schools have no obligation to seek out students with disabilities for 
census purposes alone—to simply document how many exist.26 This 
                                                     
19. CTR. ON DEVELOPING CHILD, HARVARD UNIV., FROM BEST PRACTICES TO BREAKTHROUGH 
IMPACTS: A SCIENCE-BASED APPROACH TO BUILDING A MORE PROMISING FUTURE FOR YOUNG 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (2016), https://46y5eh11fhgw3ve3ytpwxt9r-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/From_Best_Practices_to_Breakthrough_Impacts-4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AR9L-KSP8]. 
20. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35 (discussing evaluation and placement); see also Protecting Students with Disabilities: 
Frequently Asked Questions About Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T 
EDUC.: OFFICE C.R.., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html [https://perma.cc/V5RD-2ZUD] 
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS] (FAQ # 34). 
23. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35. Instead, disability rights laws require individualized assessments to 
determine whether a disability exists and what, if any, special education or related services are 
required to ensure meaningful access to education. 
24. See infra section III.A.  
25. See infra section III.A.2. 
26. See infra section III.A.2.  
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presents a problem for a plaintiff’s ACEs theory.27 Not all children 
exposed to trauma will experience the same effects.28 A school can be 
aware of the potential impacts of ACEs on child development, learning, 
and behavior, but that awareness does not necessarily trigger an obligation 
to begin the eligibility process in all cases. And it certainly does not—
without evaluation—immediately trigger the obligation to provide 
accommodations, special education, or related services.29 
Third, these cases conflate an obligation to identify students with 
disabilities with the obligation to provide affirmative education services 
and supports. The duty to identify students, as contained in child find, is 
universal; it applies to all students suspected of having disabilities that 
require special education or related services.30 But, the duty to provide 
affirmative services to ensure a Free Appropriate Public Education 
(FAPE) is an individual right.31 FAPE is rooted in an individual child’s 
right to an educational program designed to meet their needs as adequately 
as their non-disabled peers.32 
Class claims demanding system-wide changes in educational services 
have the power to effectively alter education for all students.33 By 
definition, systemic reforms that change the delivery of education for all 
children are not tied to an individual student’s needs, but rather are driven 
by the group’s collective needs.34 While the group may, in fact, require 
                                                     
27. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶  306–18; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 201–07 
(discussing plaintiffs’ theory that school districts are liable under Section 504 for their failure to 
identify students experiencing ACEs as students with disabilities). 
28. About ACEs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseandneglect/acestudy/aboutace.html 
[https://perma.cc/WMA5-PV2V] (“The presence of ACEs does not mean that a child will experience 
poor outcomes. However, children’s positive experiences or protective factors can prevent children 
from experiencing adversity and can protect against many of the negative health and life outcomes 
even after adversity has occurred.”). 
29. See infra section III.A.3.  
30. Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32(a), 104.35(a) (2019). 
31. Id. § 104.33. 
32. Id. § 104.33(b)–(c). In order to satisfy Section 504’s FAPE requirement, a school must comply 
with evaluation and placement requirements, afford procedural safeguards, and inform students’ 
parents or guardians of those safeguards. Id. § 104.35(a) (evaluation and placement); Id. § 104.36 
(procedural safeguards). 
33. Likely the most famous class-based claim in the context of education reform is Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate but equal educational facilities for racial 
minorities is inherently unequal, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
34. Systemic Reform, GLOSSARY EDUC. REFORM (Aug. 29, 2013), 
https://www.edglossary.org/systemic-reform/ [https://perma.cc/WT8Z-X2GP] (“[T]he concept of 
systemic reform may be used in reference to (1) reforms that impact multiple levels of the education 
system, such as elementary, middle, and high school programs; (2) reforms that aspire to make 
changes throughout a defined system, such as district-wide or statewide reforms; (3) reforms that are 
intended to influence, in minor or significant ways, every student and staff member in school or 
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and benefit from these curricular changes, the FAPE standard—and thus 
disability rights law—does not compel them. 
Relatedly, by demanding system-wide relief, these lawsuits stretch the 
purpose of disability law, and by doing so, risk over-inclusion. Although 
the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA have brought about sweeping 
changes for students with disabilities, over time, none of these laws were 
enacted to facilitate school-wide curricular remedies.35 Moreover, school-
wide remedies would capture both students who need these additional 
supports as well as students who may not. While this may be an efficient 
way to address the broader impacts of ACEs, the law only requires 
remedies targeted at individual student needs.36 
Finally, broadening disability eligibility to include mere exposure to 
ACEs can have the unintended consequence of unfairly stigmatizing 
impoverished minority children as impaired.37 While ACEs cut across 
socio-economic classes, certain individuals are at higher risk for exposure 
to ACEs.38 Children at or near the poverty level are more than twice as 
likely as affluent children to experience a statistically significant number 
of ACEs.39 Because children in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty 
and violence have greater obvious exposure to ACEs, entire 
neighborhoods of children could be classified as disabled.40 Of course, 
students with disabilities do not deserve the stigma sometimes associated 
with disability. And while society has come a long way in its general 
understanding and respect for persons with disabilities, barriers to 
                                                     
system; or (4) reforms that may vary widely in design and purpose, but that nevertheless reflect a 
consistent educational philosophy or that are aimed at achieving common objectives.”). 
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012) (short title; findings; purposes); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) 
(nondiscrimination under federal grants and programs); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309–13 (1988); 
Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases, 16 TEX. J. ON 
C.L. & C.R. 1 (2010); U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 (“Section 504 is a federal law designed 
to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities in programs and activities that receive Federal 
financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Education.”).  
36. See infra section III.B.  
37. See infra section III.D.  
38. Melissa T. Merrick et al., Prevalence of Adverse Childhood Experiences from 2011–2014 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System in 23 States, 172 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1038, 1038 (2018) 
(finding that “participants who identified as black, Hispanic, or multiracial, those with less than a high 
school education, those with annual income less than $15,000, those who were unemployed or unable 
to work, and those identifying as gay/lesbian or bisexual reported significantly higher exposure to 
[ACEs] than comparison groups”). 
39. CHILD TRENDS, supra note 7 (“Poor children and near-poor children are more than twice as 
likely than their more affluent peers to have had three or more other adverse experiences.”). 
40. For example, the plaintiffs in the P.P. case alleged that all children in Compton should be 
considered individuals with disabilities under Section 504. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 58. 
 
14 - Raj (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/23/2020  11:34 AM 
2019] DISABILITY LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM 1839 
 
acceptance still remain.41 Certainly, ensuring students receive the supports 
they need to succeed is beyond reproach. But assuming all children, by 
virtue of growing up in a certain community, are in need of special 
education or accommodations is stigmatizing and can have long-term 
negative consequences on how these students view themselves and are 
viewed by others.42 
The foregoing critiques are hard ones to lodge. Children from 
struggling communities plagued by drug epidemics, marred by violence, 
and devoid of economic development are, undoubtedly, negatively 
impacted by those environments.43 These children can struggle to manage 
stress and regulate emotions, thereby limiting their chances of educational 
success.44 Advocates’ new claims shine a much-needed spotlight on the 
breadth and immediacy of this problem. Their efforts underscore the fact 
that community wide challenges require large-scale fixes. This Article 
echoes all these concerns, even if it raises questions about whether and 
how disability law provides a remedy. The solution, however, is not to fit 
a square peg into a round hole. 
The solution is to fill the gap in existing laws and remedies that this 
Article’s critique reveals. First, rather than leveraging disability rights laws 
for sweeping programmatic changes, advocates should leverage the laws’ 
child find mandate in individual cases where students are clearly evidencing 
learning or behavioral challenges. Methodically bringing a series of child 
find claims would pressure schools to enhance their screening tools. 
Enhanced screening tools would, in turn, improve early identification of 
ACEs-impacted students.45 Advocates could demand comprehensive 
evaluations for these individual students followed by individualized 
education plans aimed at remediating the effects of ACEs. In short, rather 
than assuming all children have a disability, this strategy forces schools to 
identify those who do earlier. Moreover, if aggregate results reveal that a 
critical mass of individual students could benefit from the same supports, 
such as mental health counseling and social emotional skills training, a 
school could elect to offer such changes school-wide. This is the very 
remedy the current lawsuits seek. But this choice would be based on the 
                                                     
41. Brian East, Struggling to Fulfill Its Promise: The ADA at 15, 68 TEX. B.J. 614, 615 (2005) 
(arguing that judicial opposition exists toward the ADA preventing disabled individuals from reaping 
its intended benefits). 
42. See infra section III.D.  
43. Evans & Kim, supra note 7, at 44 (discussing how children growing up in poverty are more 
likely to “experience a greater array of physical and psychosocial stressors” including family conflict 
and turmoil and exposure to violence).  
44. Nadine J. Burke et al., The Impact of Adverse Childhood Experiences on an Urban Pediatric 
Population, 35 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 408 (2011). 
45. See infra section IV.G.  
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school’s response to individualized data gathered on their student 
population, not on broad assumptions based on community characteristics. 
Second, federal and state legislators should create targeted grants that 
direct funding to schools serving large populations of students impacted 
by ACEs.46 School districts could apply for funding upon a showing that 
a threshold percentage of their student population was exposed to a 
statistically significant number of ACEs.47 This funding could be used to 
implement trauma-informed training for teachers and school officials, 
mental health counseling for students, and other evidence-based 
interventions that have proven effective in addressing the impacts of 
ACEs. The availability of these grants would incentivize school districts 
to be proactive in identifying and serving students impacted by ACEs.48 
They would also facilitate a grassroots approach, encouraging 
communities to identify their particular needs and the resources that 
would best meet those needs. 
Critics may argue that children facing the immediate challenges of high 
crime and poverty cannot wait for Congress to act or for schools to choose 
to address their needs. And they are right—these children need relief now. 
But disability laws can pressure school districts to address at least some 
of their educational needs without distorting the overall legal framework. 
Stretching the laws beyond their bounds is just as likely to undermine 
support and enforcement of the laws as it is to secure the remedies 
plaintiffs seek. The IDEA, for instance, already provides far fewer 
resources than schools need and is routinely charged as being overly 
burdensome.49 The better approach is to continue to fight for ACEs-
impacted children through provisions that grant established individualized 
remedies for such students, such as comprehensive evaluations to address 
individualized needs, and pursue congressional action for systemic 
remedies that are not currently available. Proceeding with this more 
measured approach will help guard against the dangers of over-inclusion. 
                                                     
46. See infra section IV.H. 
47. Felitti et al., supra note 5 (demonstrating an increased chance of negative health outcomes when 
four or more ACEs are identified). 
48. While over-identification of children with disabilities is always a concern, this solution 
mitigates against that problem because funding flows from exposure to a statistically significant 
number of risk factors. It is not tied to disability category or eligibility as an “individual with a 
disability.” See infra section IV.B.  
49. See generally Miriam Kurtzig Freedman, Special Education: Its Ethical Dilemmas, Entitlement 
Status, and Suggested Systemic Reform, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that the IDEA as written 
has outlived its purpose and instead created many unintended consequences including an increase in 
children eligible under the IDEA and thus an increased cost to educating these students, and stressful 
procedural demands that take teachers out of classrooms and away from teaching). 
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I. ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES (ACES) MEET 
DISABILITY RIGHTS 
A. The Science: Exploring the Impacts of ACEs 
In 1998, a groundbreaking study from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) and Kaiser Permanente shifted the way the 
scientific community conceptualized adult physical and mental health by 
identifying a correlation between ACEs and poor adult health outcomes.50 
Since then several studies have further explored the impacts of adverse 
childhood experiences on adult health outcomes, as well as child physical 
and mental health.51 An expanding body of research now supports the 
theory that ACEs can disrupt healthy brain development with significant 
implications for learning, behavior, and health.52 
1. ACEs Defined 
The original ACEs study consisted of nine categories: emotional abuse, 
physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional and physical neglect, household 
substance abuse, household mental illness, parental separation or divorce, 
household domestic violence, and incarcerated household member.53 
Additional adverse factors have been added to the original study, 
including death of a parent, community violence, and poverty.54 While 
some stress in life is normal and can even promote healthy development, 
the type of stress that results when a child experiences ACEs may become 
destructive when there is “strong, frequent, or prolonged activation of the 
body’s stress response systems in the absence of the buffering protection 
                                                     
50. See generally Felitti et al., supra note 5. 
51. Marilyn Metzler et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and Life Opportunities: Shifting the 
Narrative, 72 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 141, 147 (2016); see also E. Jane Costello et al., The 
Prevalence of Potentially Traumatic Events in Childhood and Adolescence, 15 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 
99, 107 (2002); Araceli Gonzalez et al., Trauma Exposure in Elementary School Children: 
Description of Screening Procedures, Level of Exposure, and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms, 8 SCH. 
MENTAL HEALTH 77, 83 (2016); Johanna K.P. Greeson et al., Traumatic Childhood Experiences in 
the 21st Century: Broadening and Building on the ACE Studies with Data from the National Child 
Traumatic Stress Network, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 536, 548–50 (2014); Violence 
Prevention: Risk and Protective Factors, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 27, 2019), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/youthviolence/riskprotectivefactors.html 
[https://perma.cc/EC3J-LML2]. 
52. Laura J. Hickman et al., How Much Does “How Much” Matter?: Assessing the Relationship 
Between Children’s Lifetime Exposure to Violence and Trauma Symptoms, Behavior Problems, and 
Parenting Stress, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1338, 1341, 1355–56 (2012); Jack P. Shonkoff et 
al., The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic Stress, 129 PEDIATRICS e232, e237 
(2012), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/129/1/e232.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GQ8X-AV3H]. 
53. Felitti et al., supra note 5, at 248. 
54. Metzler et al., supra note 51, at 142. 
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of a supportive, adult relationship.”55 Scientists categorize this type of 
stress as “toxic” because it can lead to long-term impairment and can 
actually disrupt the development of brain architecture and other organ 
systems.56 Studies have demonstrated a “dose-response” relationship 
between a person’s number of ACEs and resulting psychological and 
physical conditions.57 The original ACEs study evidenced that adults who 
identified more than four ACE categories were more likely to suffer from 
various chronic diseases than adults with zero ACEs.58 
The fact that a child has experienced one of the categories of ACEs 
does not automatically indicate that the child will experience long-term 
negative impacts on health or development.59 Children, like adults, vary 
in their capacity to develop resiliency. Some will surely develop internal 
and external resources to manage these negative experiences.60 ACEs 
become problematic when a child lacks the tools to overcome them. 
Moreover, as the following discussion illuminates, the more ACEs 
children encounter, the more likely they are to experience toxic stress and 
the corresponding negative impacts on health and development. 
Before moving on, it is helpful to clarify terminology used to describe 
the impact of exposure to multiple or persistent ACEs. The term “toxic 
stress” is used to describe the point at which ACEs begin to negatively 
impact physical and emotional health.61 The term “complex trauma” is 
also generally used to describe exposure to multiple traumatic events and 
                                                     
55. Shonkoff et al., supra note 52, at e236. 
56. Id. “[T]he National Scientific Council on the Developing Child coined the term ‘toxic stress’ 
to describe extensive, scientific knowledge about the effects of excessive activation of stress response 
systems on a child’s developing brain, as well as the immune system, metabolic regulatory systems, 
and cardiovascular system.” ACEs and Toxic Stress: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. ON THE 
DEVELOPING CHILD: HARV. U., https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/aces-and-toxic-stress-
frequently-asked-questions/#ACEs [https://perma.cc/HJD9-FE6C]. 
57. Felitti et al., supra note 5, at 250. 
58. Id. Subsequent studies have shown that adults endorsing more than 4 ACEs are 2.6 times as 
likely to have Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), hepatitis (2.4 times as likely), 
sexually transmitted infections (2.5) and injection drug use (4.6). Id. at 245. 
59. Violence Prevention, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childabuseandneglect/acestudy/aboutace.html 
[https://perma.cc/B3UV-EW6J] (“The presence of ACEs does not mean that a child will experience 
poor outcomes. However, children’s positive experiences or protective factors can prevent children 
from experiencing adversity and can protect against many of the negative health and life outcomes 
even after adversity has occurred.”). 
60. Id.; see also Cathryn Delude, Scars That Don’t Fade, PROTO (Dec. 23, 2015), 
http://protomag.com/articles/scars-that-dont-fade [https://perma.cc/47RP-HS2M] (discussing how 
researchers are trying to understand “the mechanisms that enable some children to handle stress even 
when it becomes chronic”).  
61. Shonkoff et al., supra note 52, at e236. 
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the resulting symptoms, which can be both physical and psychological.62 
Complex trauma is sometimes used to describe exposure of four or more 
ACEs.63 This Article will use both “complex trauma” and “toxic stress” 
to mean exposure to multiple or persistent ACEs that has resulted in 
negative physical or psychological symptoms. 
2. ACEs and Child Development 
Numerous studies have demonstrated the impacts toxic stress can have 
on both physical and mental health for children.64 Beginning as early as 
the prenatal period, fetal exposure to maternal stress can influence later 
stress responsiveness.65 Persistently elevated levels of stress hormones 
can actually change the physical development of the brain which can 
impact several important physiological and cognitive functions.66 For 
instance, exposure to stressful experiences has been shown to influence 
attention, memory, learning, and executive functioning (the umbrella term 
to describe skills needed for self-regulation and mental control).67 
Consequently, when a child grows up under constant or extreme stress, 
the body’s stress-response systems may not develop normally. 
A child experiencing multiple or persistent ACEs may have an altered 
baseline state of cognitive arousal.68 Thus, even when there is no external 
threat, the child is physiologically experiencing a state of fight or flight.69 
When this child encounters even ordinary levels of stress, the child may 
automatically respond as if under extreme stress.70 For example, the child 
may experience rapid breathing or heart pounding, or may completely 
                                                     
62. ALEXANDRA COOK ET AL., NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK COMPLEX TRAUMA 
TASK FORCE, COMPLEX TRAUMA IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 5 (2003). 
63. David Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies: Childhood Trauma, Spatial Inequality, and Law, 
101 MARQ. L. REV. 601, 610 (2018); Effects, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK 
[hereinafter Effects], https://www.nctsn.org/what-is-child-trauma/trauma-types/complex-
trauma/effects [https://perma.cc/BUY9-JGLA]. 
64. Gonzalez et al., supra note 51, at 83; Metzler et al., supra note 51, at 141–42 (citing to several 
studies within this paper); Bruce D. Perry & Ronnie Pollard, Homeostasis, Stress, Trauma, and 
Adaptation: A Neurodevelopmental View of Childhood Trauma, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 33, 33–51 (1998). 
65. See Shonkoff et al., supra note 52. 
66. Id. at e236. 
67. Id. 
68. Perry & Pollard, supra note 64, at 33–51 (“Simply stated, the child is in a persisting fear 
‘state.’ . . . the child’s new basal homeostatic or equilibrium emotional state is a state of anxiety.”); 
see also Delude, supra note 60 (discussing how “stress can become a chronic irritant” when the stress-
response system is repeatedly activated or fails to turn off). 
69. Perry & Pollard, supra note 64, at 33–51. 
70. Id. at 33–51 (“Everyday stresses that previously may not have elicited any response are now 
able to elicit an exaggerated reactivity in children who are hyperreactive and overly sensitive.”). 
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shut down.71 These responses are out of proportion to the level of stress 
encountered and can be perceived as “‘overreacting,’ or as unresponsive 
or detached.”72 
The adaptive responses that help the child survive and cope in a chaotic 
and unpredictable home environment often put the child at a disadvantage 
in the educational setting. When a stressor arises—for example an argument 
with a peer or demanding school task—an ACEs-impacted child can 
escalate to a state of fear very quickly. As one researcher aptly described, 
“[a] child with a brain adapted for an environment of chaos, 
unpredictability, threat, and distress is ill-suited to the modern classroom or 
playground.”73 Thus, it will come as no surprise to learn that children coping 
with toxic stress have lower academic achievement, higher instances of 
behavioral problems, and are more likely to drop out of school altogether.74 
Quite obviously, such outsized reactions to stress can inhibit a child’s 
ability to successfully engage in school and navigate relationships with 
both teachers and peers. Children impacted by toxic stress are more likely 
to experience both academic failure and behavioral challenges in school. 
One study found that children who have experienced three or more ACEs 
faced the following consequences: they were four times more likely to 
experience academic failure, five times more likely to have serious 
attendance problems, and six times more likely to incur serious school 
behavior problems.75 As a result of the growing influence of ACEs 
research, many schools have begun to turn their attention towards 
adopting trauma-informed practices.76 Schools are beginning to realize 
that a majority of their student populations have encountered at least one 
                                                     
71. Id. (discussing the effects of repeated exposure to childhood trauma including: hyperactivity, 
anxiety, behavioral impulsivity, rapid heart rate, and “freezing”). 
72. Effects, supra note 63. 
73. Bruce D. Perry, Maltreatment and the Developing Child: How Early Childhood Experience 
Shapes Child and Culture, CTR. CHILD. & FAM. JUST. SYS. 2–3 (Sept. 23, 2004), 
http://www.lfcc.on.ca/mccain/perry.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB4N-BDQS] (“Compared to their peers, 
therefore, traumatized children may have less capacity to tolerate the normal demands and stresses of 
school, home, and social life.”). 
74. Hertel & Johnson, supra note 8; AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, CHRONIC STRESS AND THE RISK OF 
HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUT, 3–5 (2018), https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/sbhc/chronic_stress. 
ashx?la=en&hash=F5FB7AF535D2CDA4CBC81236DBCE6580B53607E4 [https://perma.cc/PSP9-
MVBE]; Christopher M. Layne et al., Cumulative Trauma Exposure and High Risk Behavior in 
Adolescence: Findings from the National Child Traumatic Stress Network Core Data Set, 6 PSYCHOL. 
TRAUMA: THEORY, RES. PRAC. POL’Y S40, S42, S45 (2014). 
75. CHRISTOPHER BLODGETT, NO SCHOOL ALONE: HOW COMMUNITY RISKS AND ASSETS 
CONTRIBUTE TO SCHOOL AND YOUTH SUCCESS 25 (2015), https://traumasensitiveschools.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/no_school_alone-Washington-State.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7H8-LZXJ]. 
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ACE.77 Further, as the following section describes, public schools 
comprised of a majority of students from impoverished communities may 
find much higher incidences of students impacted by toxic stress. 
3. ACEs and Chronically Impoverished Communities 
ACEs occur regularly with children across race, socio-economic class, 
and geographic regions, but children living in poverty are at higher risk 
for more ACEs.78 The more ACEs a child experiences, the more likely 
they are to have negative physical or psychological symptoms.79 Results 
of nationally collected data demonstrate that “poor children . . . are more 
than twice as likely than their more affluent peers to have had three or 
more adverse experiences.”80 Just as with adults, children experiencing 
multiple ACEs evidence an increased risk for poor outcomes.81 Children 
with two or more ACEs were nearly three times more likely to repeat a 
grade in school, compared to children without any ACEs.82 Children with 
four or more ACEs were significantly more likely to have learning or 
behavior problems than children reporting zero ACEs.83 
Research clearly demonstrates that while ACEs are present in children 
nationwide, children in poverty are disproportionately exposed to more 
trauma-inducing events.84 Moreover, studies indicate a correlation between 
children raised in communities of chronic poverty and depressed cognitive 
                                                     
77. Responding to Trauma in K-12 Schools, NAT’L CTR. ON SAFE SUPPORTIVE LEARNING ENV’TS, 
https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/responding-trauma-k-12-schools [https://perma.cc/S3ZN-
DSQB]. 
78. CHILD TRENDS, supra note 7; see also Neal Halfon et. al., Income Inequality and the 
Differential Effect of Adverse Childhood Experiences in US Children, 17 ACADEMIC PEDIATRICS 7S 
(Sept.–Oct. 2017). 
79. Burke et al., supra note 44, at 411; see also Christina D. Bethell et al., Adverse Childhood 
Experiences: Assessing the Impact on Health and School Engagement and the Mitigating Role of 
Resilience, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2106, 2109 (2014) (conducting a nationwide study finding that 48% 
of U.S. children have had at least one ACE); Matthew Kliethermes et al., Complex Trauma, 23 CHILD 
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 339, 341 (2014). 
80. CHILD TRENDS, supra note 7, at 158. 
81. Burke et al., supra note 44. 
82. Bethell et al., supra note 79, at 2110. The effect remained even after adjusting for demographic 
and health status factors. 
83. Three percent of participants with an ACE score of zero had learning/behavior problems, while 
51.2% of participants with an ACE score of four or more displayed learning/behavior problems. Burke 
et al., supra note 44. 
84. Troutt, supra note 63, at 614; see also Nat’l Sci. Council on the Developing Child, Persistent Fear and 
Anxiety Can Affect Young Children’s Learning and Development 8 (Center on the Developing Child, Harv. Univ., 
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development.85 Several potential causes exist, including poor nutrition, 
prenatal substance abuse, and increased exposure to toxins.86 In addition, 
poor children tend to be raised in homes with less cognitive stimulation 
(fewer books, educational toys, and opportunities for educational 
experiences).87 While science has yet to establish a causal effect between 
poverty and cognitive deficits, a number of studies have established that 
environment and experience can impact cognitive development.88 
Children living in neighborhoods of concentrated and chronic poverty 
are at higher risk for experiencing toxic stress because their risk of 
exposure to traumatic events is increased.89 One example is an increased 
risk of exposure to community violence. While violence is certainly not 
present in all low-income communities, nor is it limited to such 
communities, isolated communities battling chronic poverty also struggle 
with higher incidence of violence.90 Several studies have evidenced the 
many negative impacts resulting from youth exposure to community 
violence, including the following: posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
anxiety, depression, and dissociation, as well as lower capacity for 
empathy, and diminished self-esteem.91 One study found that “[y]outh 
exposed to violence have decreased social competence and increased rates 
of peer rejection, as well as decreased IQ and reading ability, lower grade-
point average (GPA), more days of school absence, and decreased rates 
of high school graduation.”92 
Recently, two separate class-action lawsuits have attempted to leverage 
this research to claim children growing up in impoverished and violent 
communities should be considered disabled within the meaning of disability 
                                                     
85. Martha J. Farah et al., Poverty, Privilege, and Brain Development: Empirical Findings and 
Ethical Implications, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 
(Judy Illes ed., 2004); see, e.g., Richard Monasterksy, Researchers Probe How Poverty Harms 
Children’s Brains, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 29, 2008, (describing new research attempting to 
identify the environmental factors associated with living in poverty that have a negative effect on 
cognitive development).  
86. James E. Ryan, Poverty as Disability and the Future of Special Education Law, 101 GEO. L.J. 
1455, 1483 (2013). 
87. Id. 
88. Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCI. 976 (2013).  
89. Corina Graif et al., Urban Poverty and Neighborhood Effects on Crime: Incorporating Spatial 
and Network Perspectives, 8 SOC. COMPASS 1140 (2014); see also Matthew R. Lee, Concentrated 
Poverty, Race and Homicide, 41 SOC. Q. 189 (2000). 
90. Graif et al., supra note 89; see also Lee, supra note 89. 
91. Eugene Aisenberg & Ferol E. Mennen, Children Exposed to Community Violence: Issues for 
Assessment and Treatment, 17 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 341, 344 (2000); Sheryl Kataoka 
et al., Effects on School Outcomes in Low-Income Minority Youth: Preliminary Findings from a 
Community-Partnered Study of a School Trauma Intervention, 21 ETHNICITY & DISEASE S1-71, S1-
71 (2011); Jeff Grogger, Local Violence, Educational Attainment, and Teacher Pay (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6003, 1997). 
92. Kataoka et al., supra note 91. 
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rights laws.93 In seeking eligibility as students with disabilities under these 
laws, the suits aimed to access the concomitant rights to special education 
and related supports and services.94 The following sections will provide an 
overview of relevant disability rights laws and then walk through the legal 
theories that weave ACEs and disability laws together into class action 
litigation seeking broad-based educational reforms. 
B. The Laws: An Overview of Disability Rights Laws 
Three laws govern the education of students with disabilities in public 
schools: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),95 Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,96 and Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).97 While the laws certainly interact with each 
other, there are some distinct differences. The IDEA applies only to 
children and creates the most affirmative rights for students with 
disabilities in schools.98 Section 504 and the ADA are broader anti-
discrimination laws that protect all qualifying individuals with disabilities 
in a variety of public settings, including public schools.99 Section 504 and 
the ADA are often thought of as protecting negative rights, since they 
promise the right to be free from discrimination; but they, too, contain 
important affirmative rights for students with disabilities including the 
right to accommodations and special education when necessary to ensure 
equal access to education.100 The following section will briefly describe 
each law and explain how a student becomes eligible for statutory 
protections under each. 
1. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
The IDEA operates much like a contract in which the federal government 
promises funding to schools who agree to abide by the law’s proscriptions 
                                                     
93. Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D. 
Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018); P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
94. Id. 
95. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (2012). 
96. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485; see generally LAURA ROTHSTEIN & SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL 
EDUCATION LAW (4th ed. 2010). 
99. See generally ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 287–99. Section 504 and the ADA are 
similar in terms of eligibility for protections, but the ADA is much more expansive in that it does not 
only reach recipients of federal funding. 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12182; 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019). 
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regarding the treatment of students with disabilities.101 In order to be 
eligible for IDEA services, a child must meet the statute’s definition of a 
“child with a disability”—meaning the child  must fall into one of the 
thirteen recognized categories of disability, the disability must adversely 
impact education, and the child must need special education and related 
services as a result.102 The IDEA’s disability categories are legal, not 
medical, definitions of disability and they are not without controversy.103 
The IDEA’s purpose is to ensure that all children with disabilities receive 
special education and related services designed to meet their “unique” 
needs.104 Once a child meets the statutory definition of a “child with a 
disability,” they are entitled to a Free Appropriate Public Education 
(FAPE).105 The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean an 
“individualized education program” (IEP) reasonably calculated to enable 
a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.106 
IDEA eligible students also have a right to education in the least restrictive 
environment as well as a number of due process rights.107 
The law also obligates schools to affirmatively seek out children 
suspected of having a disability and in need of special education.108 This 
obligation is known as child find and is quite expansive.109 Schools 
typically fulfill this obligation by enacting policies to help screen all 
                                                     
101. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (federal statute governing the rights of eligible students 
with disabilities in schools). 
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8. 
103. See Mark Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 83, 91–92, 122–52 (2009). 
Intellectual disability, emotional disturbance, and specific learning disability are subjectively 
measured and thus, prone to bias on the part of evaluators, as evidenced by the over-representation of 
minority children who make up these categories. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA: Shifting 
Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071 
(2005); see also Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 
WIS. L. REV. 1237 (1995). If, by virtue of eligibility for special education services, students improved 
their educational outcomes, such over-representation would warrant minimal concern. Unfortunately, 
data illustrates that students with special education needs (and particularly students receiving services 
under the category of emotional disturbance) achieve markedly less educational success. SHARON 
VAUGHN ET AL., DEEPER LEARNING FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 3 (2015), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED560790.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD3L-9YRM] (“According to the 
most recent [National Assessment of Educational Progress] (NCES 2013), 38−45 percent of students 
without disabilities performed at the proficient level or above in reading and mathematics in fourth 
and eighth grade, while a mere 8−17 percent of students with disabilities did so . . . .”). 
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (purposes). 
105. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9) (FAPE definition); § 1401(3) (child with a disability). 
106. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 991 
(2017). 
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (least restrictive environment); Id. § 1415 (procedural safeguards).  
108. Id. § 1412(a)(3). 
109. Id. 
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students for any deviations from normal child development.110 The results 
of such screenings may indicate a problem that warrants further 
investigation.111 When this happens, the IDEA demands individualized 
comprehensive assessments to determine whether a child qualifies for 
services under the statute and, if so, the particular services and supports 
needed to progress in school.112 Courts have not reached a clear consensus 
regarding when a school will be held liable for failure to timely identify a 
child with a disability.113 Some courts hold schools liable for child find 
violations when they “overlook[] ‘clear signs of disability’ . . . [were] 
‘negligent in failing to order testing,’” or when there appears to be “no 
rational justification for not deciding to evaluate.”114 
The IDEA clearly provides important substantive and procedural 
protections for students who meet the law’s definition of a “child with a 
disability.” The likelihood that a child impacted by ACEs will be able to 
meet this definition will largely be dependent on the individual child’s 
circumstances.115 
2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act 
In contrast to the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA offer broader 
coverage as they apply to all individuals, not just students, who meet the 
statutes’ relevant definitions of disability and because that definition itself 
is expansive.116 Section 504 was the first federal statute to prohibit 
discrimination against the disabled, stating, “[n]o otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his 
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
                                                     
110. Typical screenings include hearing and vision screens. State-wide achievement tests can also 
be used to screen for deviations from the average. ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 98, at 86. 
111. Id. 
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Importantly, these evaluations must use a variety of 
assessment tools and cannot rely on one single measure, such as a child’s full-scale intelligent 
quotient, to determine eligibility for special education. Id. § 1414(b)(2)(B). 
113. Perry A. Zirkel, Child Find: The “Reasonable Period” Requirement, 311 EDUC. L. REP. 576, 
577–78 (2015) (discussing varying courts’ approaches to determining when a school has complied 
with evaluation of the child within a “reasonable period”). 
114. Demarcus L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 13 C 5331, 2014 WL 948883, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
11, 2014) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 
D.G. v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 481 F. App’x 887 (5th Cir. 2012); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown, 
769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 942−43 (E.D. Va. 2010); Perry A. Zirkel, “Child Find”: The Lore v. The Law, 
307 EDUC. L. REP. 574 (2014). 
115. Eligibility for such a child is discussed further in section II.B. 
116. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012). 
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Federal financial assistance . . . .”117 Despite this broad language, Section 
504 was largely unenforced and thus, proved ineffective at eradicating 
disability discrimination.118 In response, the ADA was enacted in 1990 to 
“provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination 
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”119 Title II of the 
ADA was based in large part on Section 504, with Title II regulations 
patterned after Section 504 regulations.120 Both operate as 
nondiscrimination statutes and bar organizations from discriminating 
against persons with disabilities for reasons related to their disabilities.121 
Section 504 is limited to any program or activity receiving federal funds 
and Title II extends this prohibition to all public organizations.122 Thus, 
both statutes apply to public schools. 
In addition, both laws define disability as (1) “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities”; (2) having “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) “being 
regarded as having such an impairment.”123 To clarify and expand the 
law’s definition of disability, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008.124 The expanded definition applies equally to Section 504.125 
                                                     
117. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
118. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. 
L. REV. 393, 394, 416 (1991) (“In the ADA, Congress determined, as apparently did the Executive, 
that section 504 simply was not working as a means of eradicating discrimination and segregation in 
this country. Congress found that, even though section 504 had been the law for seventeen years, 
‘society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and despite some 
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a 
serious and pervasive social problem.’”). 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012); see also Nancy L. Jones, Overview and Essential 
Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 479 (1991). 
120. The regulations under Section 504 and the ADA must be “consistent” with each other. 42 
U.S.C. § 12134(b). Further, courts may not construe the provision of the ADA “to apply a lesser 
standard than the standards applied under [Section 504] or the regulations issued by Federal agencies 
pursuant” to Section 504. Id. § 12201(a). Thus, courts generally apply the same analysis to both laws. 
The regulations pursuant to Title II of the ADA are found at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, and the regulations 
under Section 504 are found at 28 C.F.R. pt. 42 (G). 
121. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
122. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
123. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
124. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (Amendments Act), Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 
(2008) (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).  
125.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). The Amendments Act amended both the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act definition of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; 154 CONG. REC. S8342, 8346 
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 3406); see also RUSSLYNN 
ALI, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE 
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES ATTENDING PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Jan. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Attending Public Elementary], 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-504faq-201109.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GJZ-
GRNV]; Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. 
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Consequently, the definition of disability under Section 504 and the ADA 
is substantially broader than that under the IDEA and thus, generally 
speaking, a child who is eligible for services under the IDEA will usually 
qualify for services under either Section 504 or Title II of the ADA.126 
Both Section 504 and the ADA convey important affirmative rights to 
students in public schools.127 Like the IDEA, they obligate schools to find 
children with disabilities who need special education or related services 
and confer FAPE.128 But, both child find and FAPE obligations differ 
from those set forth in the IDEA, however.129 For instance, Section 504 
defines FAPE in terms of equality of access to education.130 It ensures 
access, but not outcome.131 The IDEA’s FAPE standard is not based on 
equal access, but rather calibrated to each individual student’s potential, 
mandating individualized education programs (IEPs) designed to ensure 
progress towards highly individualized goals.132 These distinctions may 
become important in determining what a school district owes a child with 
a disability under each law, but courts have only recently begun to 
recognize the differences.133 
What is certain, however, is that children who are eligible under either 
the IDEA, Section 504, or the ADA have the ability to assert their rights in 
                                                     
Dep’t of Educ., to Title IX Coordinators (Jan. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Dear Colleague ADA Letter], 
www.ed.gov/ocr/letters/colleague-201109.html [https://perma.cc/YT4N-XWDH]. 
126. Weber, supra note 35, at 5–9, 19.  
127. 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2019) (Procedural safeguards). 
128. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32−.35; 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b). 
129. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)−(b)(1). While the ADA does not address child find or FAPE 
specifically, the U.S. Department of Education has interpreted the ADA’s obligations to students as 
coextensive with that of Section 504. Thus, it has stated that the ADA requires a district to provide 
FAPE to the same extent as is required under Section 504 in order to comply with the ADA. See Letter 
from Gary D. Jackson, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, W. Div. Seattle (Washington), Issaquah (WA) 
School District No. 411, to Janet Berry, Superintendent, Issaquah School District No. 411 (May 2,  
2003) (on file with author); Letter from Stella B. Klugman, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, W. 
Div., San Francisco (California), Pleasant Valley (CA) Elementary Sch. Dist., to James Shroyer, 
Superintendent, Pleasant Valley Elementary Sch. Dist. (June 29, 1999) (on file with author); Letter 
from Nicole Huggins, Deputy Chief Reg. Att’y, Office for Civil Rights, W. Div. Denver (Arizona), 
Naco (AZ) Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 23, to Patricia Marsh, Superintendent, Naco Elementary Sch. 
District No. 23 (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author); Letter from Janette J. Lim, Dir. of Pol’y, Enf’t, 
and Program Service, Office for Civil Rights, E. Div. of Philadelphia, to Hon. Nick J. Rahall, House 
of Representatives, Washington, D.C. (June 22, 1994) (on file with author). 
130. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1). 
131. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2008). 
132. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 
(2017); see also Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
133. Mark H., 513 F.3d at 933 (“FAPE under the IDEA and FAPE as defined in the § 504 
regulations are similar but not identical . . . . The most important differences are that, unlike FAPE 
under the IDEA, FAPE under § 504 is defined to require a comparison between the manner in which 
the needs of disabled and non-disabled children are met, and focuses on the ‘design’ of a child’s 
educational program.”). 
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order to ensure their access to education. In the case of the IDEA, students 
with disabilities have the right to a substantive standard of education—one 
that allows them reasonable progress in light of their individual capabilities. 
Section 504 and the ADA give students with disabilities the right to equal 
access of education, commensurate to their non-disabled peers. Further, 
each law provides students with an ability to invoke these protections 
through due process procedures. The laws give students with disabilities the 
ability to challenge eligibility, placement, or provision of special education 
or related services and thus, these students can hold schools accountable in 
ways that other students cannot. The following section will explore two 
recent communities that attempted to leverage disability rights laws into 
agents of broad-based educational reforms. 
C. The Strategy: Combining Science and Disability Laws to Reform 
Sub-Standard Schools 
In two recent and innovative cases, entire communities of children 
invoked disability rights laws to demand systemic reforms to the delivery 
of education for all students—both disabled and non-disabled. The first 
case involved children from Compton, California, and the second 
involved a community of Native Americans from the Havasupai 
Nation.134 Both began as class-action lawsuits claiming that children in 
these communities faced numerous and persistent ACEs that impacted 
their ability to succeed in school,135 and that school districts were aware 
of these challenges and should have implemented accommodations and 
other supportive services to address them.136 The following section will 
introduce these groundbreaking cases and explore how their case theories 
may dramatically re-purpose disability rights statutes into agents of 
educational reform. 
In 2015, a group of students and teachers who attended and taught in 
the Compton School District in California filed a class-action lawsuit 
alleging that the school district violated Section 504 and the ADA by 
failing to timely identify and provide necessary accommodations for 
students impacted by “complex trauma.”137 The lawsuit defined “complex 
                                                     
134.  Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D. 
Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018); P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015).  
135.  Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 177–178; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 20. While 
the Compton case is a class action lawsuit invoking the rights of all students who may have attended 
Compton Unified School District, the Havasupai case was limited to the nine named plaintiffs. 
However, both sets of plaintiffs sought system-wide educational reforms as a remedy. The underlying 
question in both, is whether the law requires such a remedy. 
136.  Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 224–225; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 65–69. 
137. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 69. 
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trauma” as exposure to multiple persistent sources of violence, loss, and 
other ACEs.138 Plaintiffs pointed to well-known challenges that growing 
up in Compton brought, including poverty and high incidences of 
violence, to argue that the school district should have been aware of the 
likelihood that many of their students were suffering from complex 
trauma.139 As a result of this alleged complex trauma, the plaintiffs 
asserted they were individuals with disabilities who required specialized 
supports and services to meaningfully access education.140 
Just a year later, a similar class-action suit was filed on behalf of nine 
Native American students who lived on the Havasupai Indian Reservation 
and attended public schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Education 
(BIE).141 Plaintiffs there alleged that the BIE “knowingly failed to provide 
basic general education, a system of special education, and necessary 
wellness and mental health support to Havasupai students, resulting in 
indefensible deficits in academic achievement and educational 
attainment.”142 Just as in the Compton case, plaintiffs invoked Section 504 
regulations to claim that exposure to ACEs and complex trauma provided 
the basis for eligibility as individuals with disabilities under Section 
504.143 They argued that the BIE violated Section 504 by failing to 
identify these children as individuals with disabilities and provide them 
with necessary supports.144 
Children from both communities experience the impacts of poverty, 
community violence, and significant family disruptions at alarmingly high 
                                                     
138. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 1. Plaintiffs alleged that 24.6% of children living in Compton 
have two or more ACEs. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 2, P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 
2015).  
139. See P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 19–20, 65. 
140. Id. at 23. 
141. Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. CV-17-08004-PCT-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D. 
Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018). 
142. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 2. 
143. Plaintiffs define “complex trauma” using virtually identical language to the Compton 
plaintiffs, stating, “Complex trauma stems from the exposure to multiple persistent sources of 
violence, loss, and other adverse childhood experiences (‘ACE’s’), and describes children’s exposure 
to these events and the impact of [such] exposure.” P.P Complaint, supra note 9, at 1 n.1; see Stephen 
C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 61–62. 
144. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint contained six causes of action, four of which were 
brought under Section 504 and its implementing regulations as follows: (1) failure to provide a system 
enabling students with disabilities access to public education; (2) failure to provide a system enabling 
students impacted by childhood adversity to access public education; (3) failure to implement Section 
504’s “location and notification” regulation; and (4) failure to implement Section 504’s “procedural 
safeguards” regulation. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50–62, 
Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018) (No. 3:17-cv-
08004-SPL). 
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levels.145 Thus, in each case, by virtue of being a member of a particular 
community, a child is more likely to experience neurobiological effects of 
complex trauma resulting in impaired ability to perform activities 
essential to education including learning, thinking, reading, and 
concentrating.146 Litigants in both suits invoked disability rights laws to 
make two claims. First, that by virtue of being a member of their 
community, they were “individuals with disabilities” and, as such, entitled 
to a FAPE which includes any special education or related services 
necessary to ensure equal access to education.147 Second, that school 
districts violated child find obligations by failing to affirmatively identify 
them as children with disabilities and appropriately accommodate their 
needs. Such failure, they argued, amounted to disability discrimination.148 
Both also sought systemic relief in the form of declaratory relief and 
mandatory injunctions to institute district wide trauma sensitive 
practices.149 The plaintiffs’ desired remedies included the following: 
(1) training educators to recognize, understand, and address the effects of 
complex trauma, in part through building students’ self-regulation and 
social-emotional learning skills; (2) developing restorative justice 
practices to resolve conflicts peacefully and avoid re-traumatizing 
students through the use of punitive discipline; and (3) ensuring that 
consistent mental health support is available to appropriately meet student 
needs.150 Critically, these remedies require schools to make potentially 
                                                     
145. In this context, family disruptions refer to children being removed from the home and placed 
in foster care, parents being forcibly removed from the home due to arrest, or one parent needing to 
leave the home to seek employment elsewhere. Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 14–37, 163–
70. 
146. Compton plaintiffs also argued that students impacted by complex trauma were less able to 
conform their behavior to school expectations and consequently, more likely to face discipline and 
school exclusion. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 5. Thus, they argued that the school district not 
only failed to accommodate students impacted by complex trauma, but that it also engaged in district-
wide punitive disciplinary policies that re-triggered students’ trauma-induced disabilities. Id.  
147. Id. at 23; Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 14–37, 163–70. Each lawsuit also proceeded 
with claims under other statutes as well. The Compton students alleged an ADA violation using the 
same facts that supported their Section 504 claim, but Havasupai students did not. P.P Complaint, 
supra note 9, at 71−72. The Havasupai students brought a number of claims under federal statutes 
and regulations mandating that the BIE provide an education to Native American children that meets 
basic educational standards and enables students to access post-secondary educational opportunities. 
Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 195–271; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2000, 2001 (2012); 25 C.F.R. 
§ 32.3−32.4 (2019).  
148.  Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 91–93; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 65, 69. 
149.  Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, at 99–100; P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 72–73.  
150. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 72–73. Havasupai plaintiffs sought a number of system-wide 
reforms including, 
(1) comprehensive and ongoing training, coaching and consultation for all adult staff regarding 
trauma-informed and culturally sensitive strategies for educating students and fostering a 
healthy, supporting environment; (2) implementation of restorative practices to prevent, address, 
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significant changes to the current curriculum by adopting teaching of 
social-emotional skills as well as restorative justice practices. Further, the 
remedies demand such practices be adopted school-wide and not limited 
to only those students with a demonstrated need for such supports. 
At the time of this writing, both cases have survived motions to dismiss. 
Parties in the Compton case are engaged in out-of-court settlement, while 
the Havasupai case has completed discovery.151 Consequently, the 
question of whether a child impacted by ACEs is an individual with a 
disability, thereby receiving attendant rights under disability rights laws, 
remains unanswered. A court may ultimately adopt the Compton School 
District’s argument that while the “blight of all ‘socioeconomically 
distressed cities’ throughout America is rightfully a major 
concern . . . [p]laintiffs cannot . . . fashion[] those issues into a question 
of disability rights.”152 Courts may also be concerned about judicial 
overreach and effectively legislating educational policy from the bench.153 
These lawsuits are groundbreaking for two distinct and equally 
important reasons. First, they have the potential to expand the eligibility 
of students with disabilities to include entire neighborhoods of children 
                                                     
and heal after conflict; (3) employment of appropriately trained counselors who can assist with 
identification of students who have mental-health difficulties; (4) adoption of practices and 
interventions to enhance student wellness that are responsive to Havasupai beliefs and traditions 
and are created in partnership with community members. 
Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 63, Stephen C. v. Bureau of 
Indian Educ., 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018) (No. 3:17-cv-08004-SPL). The Compton 
plaintiffs requested school-wide trauma sensitive practices with three core components:  
(1) training for educators to recognize, understand, and proactively recognize and address the 
effects of complex trauma, in part through building students’ self-regulation and social-
emotional learning skills; (2) developing restorative practices to build healthy relationships and 
resolve conflicts peacefully and avoid re-traumatizing students through the use of punitive 
discipline; and (3) ensuring consistent mental health support is available to appropriately meet 
student needs. 
P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 4. 
151. David Washburn, How a Tiny Native American Community’s Trauma Might Impact 
Education Law, EDSOURCE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://edsource.org/2018/how-a-tiny-native-
communitys-trauma-might-impact-education-law/595719 [https://perma.cc/CV2N-ZC63].  
152. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Class Action Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 10, P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. 
Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. CV 15–3726–MWF (PLAx)). Compton Unified 
School District argued that finding for Plaintiffs would equate to courts dictating educational policy, 
something that the Supreme Court has strongly warned against. Defendants’ Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, P.P., 135 F. Supp. 
3d 1098; see infra note 153. 
153. The Supreme Court has strongly warned against courts making decisions impacting 
educational policy, stating that “courts lack the specialized knowledge and experience’ necessary to 
resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)); see also Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 
RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001−02 (2017). 
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based on geography and neighborhood characteristics. Second, they 
attempt to reconceptualize the purpose of disability rights statutes into 
agents of educational reform, impacting educational programs for all 
students—not just those with disabilities. The following sections explore 
both issues by first discussing whether ACEs-impacted students could be 
eligible for statutory protections under the various disability rights laws, 
and second, by analyzing a theory of class-based systemic relief under 
those laws. 
II. TESTING THE THEORY: ACES AS DISABILITY 
Categories of disability are ultimately social constructs and—in the 
case of disability rights laws—legal constructs. Both in medicine and the 
law, disability labels are ways to describe certain characteristics that 
appear connected and others that deviate in some way from expected 
patterns of mental or physical function.154 The relevant question for 
purposes of accessing protections found within disability rights laws is 
whether each law’s respective definition of disability encompasses the 
physical or psychological impacts brought on by exposure to ACEs. The 
science supporting the link between ACEs and changes to the stress-
response system make it plausible that some children impacted by ACEs 
may be eligible for protections under all three laws. Yet, the analysis will 
differ under each law and will be highly dependent on the individual 
characteristics of each child. The following section will walk through the 
eligibility analysis for a child impacted by ACEs and discuss the 
challenges to eligibility under each law. 
A. Eligibility Under Section 504 and the ADA 
As discussed above, Section 504 and Title II of the ADA are explicitly 
interwoven and determining eligibility under either statute requires 
largely the same analysis. Thus, the following section will analyze both 
laws jointly, noting any relevant differences.155 To be eligible under either 
                                                     
154. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 428–29 
(2000). The “social model” of the modern disability rights movement advocates that disability is not 
at all a condition of the physical body, but rather the result of an interaction between the body and 
society. 
155. “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [Section 504] shall be the remedies, 
procedures and rights [applicable to ADA claims].” 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012). “There is no 
significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999); 28 
C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (2019) (“Except as otherwise provided in this part, this part shall not be construed 
to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 . . . or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to that title.”). 
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statute, a student must have a “physical or mental impairment” that 
“substantially limits one or more major life activities.”156 Both prongs of 
the definition are construed broadly.157 The laws do not confine physical 
or mental impairments to a delineated list and can include any mental or 
psychological disorder.158 Major life activities are also interpreted broadly 
and while not confined to specific categories, do explicitly include 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, and communicating.159 
Importantly, a student may be eligible regardless of whether the condition 
affects learning as long as the condition substantially limits another major 
life activity.160 
Section 504 specifically mandates that all children who need, or are 
believed to need, special education or related services due to a disability 
receive an evaluation to help assess areas of educational need and to 
determine placement in the regular or special education setting.161 A student 
seeking Section 504 or ADA eligibility as a result of ACEs must undergo 
an evaluation designed to root out whether and how such experiences 
impact a major life activity.162 Eligibility is not limited to medically 
diagnosable conditions, but can also include traits or characteristics 
understood to be disabling in certain physical or social environments.163 
                                                     
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9)(B) (2012), (20)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1)(i). The 
Amendments Act amended the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability to conform it to that of the 
ADA. The ADA’s current definition of disability means, with respect to a person, “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; a record of such 
an impairment; or being regarding as having such an impairment . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1).  
157. Dear Colleague ADA Letter, supra note 125; Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125. 
158. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1)−(2)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (defining “physical or mental 
impairment” as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss 
affecting one or more body systems”); see also U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 (FAQ # 11). 
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9)(b), (20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2018); see also Dear Colleague 
ADA Letter, supra note 125; Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125. 
160. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii); Norfolk (VA) Public Schools, 114 L.R.P. 
47372 (Office for Civil Rights, S. Div., D.C. Va. May 16, 2014). 
161. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35. The assessment and eligibility process requires schools to “draw upon 
information from a variety of sources, including . . . teacher recommendations, physical condition, 
social or cultural background” and ensure all information is “documented and carefully considered.” 
Id. Thus, when special education or related services are at issue, Section 504 mandates that eligibility 
determinations are a team decision and that such determinations involve an examination of data from 
a variety of sources. Id.  
162. 34. C.F.R. § 104.35(a); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., PARENT AND 
EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE TO SECTION 504 IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
12 (2016) [hereinafter PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices 
/list/ocr/docs/504-resource-guide-201612.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8GV-Q7V6]. 
163. A specific diagnosis is not necessary if the school determines a student is substantially limited 
in a major life activity and that limitation is caused by a mental or physical impairment. 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 104.3(j), 104.35; see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENTS WITH 
ADHD AND SECTION 504: A RESOURCE GUIDE 23 n.70 (July 2016), attached to Dear Colleague Letter 
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While a medical diagnosis is not necessary for eligibility, some 
objective measure of the disability and its impacts is necessary.164 
Significant research currently demonstrates the impacts of multiple or 
sustained ACEs on normal child development, including physical changes 
to brain development, an altered stress-response system, and out-sized 
reactions to perceived threats.165 Given the enormity of research in the 
field evidencing harmful impacts from prolonged exposure to stressful 
experiences, it is likely that many children impacted by ACEs will 
evidence symptoms that will meet the laws’ definition of a “mental 
disorder.” However, it is certainly not true that all children with ACEs 
will have the same reaction. Thus, individual evaluations to determine 
ACEs’ effects are crucial to determine whether such exposure rises to the 
level of a mental impairment in any one child.166 
The second part of the eligibility inquiry asks whether the physical or 
mental impairment “substantially limits one or more . . . major life 
activit[y].”167 This prong is considered in relation to the average person, not 
the individual student or their peers.168 The relevant question is whether 
disability impacts an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity as 
compared to most people in the general population. Given the broad 
interpretation of disability that Congress insisted upon in the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, many students living with toxic stress will meet 
this prong with ease.169 The research focused on ACEs demonstrates effects 
                                                     
from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Title IX 
Coordinators (July 26, 2016), available at www.ed.gov/ocr/letters/colleague-201607-504-adhd.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZKV7-2WRP]; Bagenstos, supra note 154, at 428–29. 
164. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35; see also U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 ( FAQ #11). 
165.  Metzler et al., supra note 51 (citing several studies within this paper); Shonkoff et al., supra 
note 52.  
166. NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, COMPLEX TRAUMA STANDARDIZED 
MEASURES, https://www.nctsn.org/resources/complex-trauma-standardized-measures 
[https://perma.cc/2AFL-4DES]; see also KATIE EKLUND & ERIC ROSSEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH & JUVENILE JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR TRAUMA SCREENING IN SCHOOLS: A PRODUCT OF THE 
DEFENDING CHILDHOOD STATE POLICY INITIATIVE (2016), https://www.nasponline.org/x37269.xml 
[https://perma.cc/SD8X-L26P] (discussing the benefits of implementing universal screenings as an 
essential component of multi-tiered systems of support). 
167. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1)(i) (2019). 
168. See, e.g., Weidow v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 460 F. App’x 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2012).  
169. Despite the federal guidance, the substantially limits prong may still constrain eligibility by 
requiring students to demonstrate that complex trauma impacts a major life activity more than the 
average person. A few courts have found students’ claims lacking for failing to meet the substantially 
limits prong when factually specific information describing the disability’s impacts was not present 
or did not appear severe or frequent. Mann v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 535 F. App’x 405, 411–
12 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding doctor’s note diagnosing a student with anxiety disorder insufficient to 
meet the substantially limits prong); Weidow, 460 F. App’x at 185–86 (finding that a student with bi-
polar disorder failed to present sufficient evidence of substantial impact of the disorder’s effects on 
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on attention, memory, learning and executive functioning.170 This research 
supports the idea that children impacted by multiple ACEs are 
disadvantaged in ways that their peers, who have not had such experiences, 
are not.171 Further, some impacts of ACEs including learning and 
concentrating are specifically listed as major life activities in the ADA.172 
In short, Section 504 and the ADA permit an expansive understanding 
of what can qualify as a disabling condition. Students suffering from 
impacts of toxic stress will likely be able to find refuge in the laws’ 
protections. While the eligibility under both laws is theoretically available 
to these students, individual eligibility determinations are required. 
Importantly, eligibility is not based on one single test or diagnosis, but 
rather involves a team decision.173 Thus, it will be crucial for school 
officials to be aware of the research behind ACEs and the resulting 
impacts on development and behavior in order to make the connection 
between exposure to ACEs and impacts on learning, behavior, and/or 
other major life activities. 
B. Eligibility Under the IDEA 
The IDEA sets much narrower parameters around who is considered a 
“child with a disability” and as such, eligible for statutory protections.174 
The IDEA limits eligibility to thirteen categories of disability.175 Each 
category represents a legal—not medical—definition of disability, and 
further instructs that the disability must adversely impact the child’s 
educational performance.176 Courts have interpreted educational 
performance broadly to include non-academic skills such as behavior and 
peer relationships.177 Courts have also interpreted “advers[ity]” to mean 
any negative effect and have rejected schools’ attempts to frame this 
requirement as “significant” or “substantial” adversity.178 Finally, in order 
to be eligible for statutory protections, under the IDEA a child must 
                                                     
her interactions with others despite presenting evidence of peer relationship troubles).  
170. Shonkoff et al., supra note 52. 
171. See supra section I.A.3.  
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2012). 
173. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35(c) (2019). 
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Mr. I. ex rel. L.I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
school improperly denied IDEA eligibility to a child with Asperger’s Syndrome and depressive 
disorder whose needs were social and emotional but not academic). 
178. Id. at 13. 
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require special education and related services as a result of the 
disability.179 All three prongs present obstacles to eligibility for students 
impacted by ACEs. 
Of the IDEA’s thirteen disability categories, students suffering the 
effects of toxic stress will most likely be classified under “emotional 
disturbance.”180 As one court of appeals aptly described, this category 
identifies “a class of children who are disabled only in the sense that their 
abnormal emotional conditions prevent them from choosing normal 
responses to normal situations.”181 Emotional disturbance encompasses 
conditions that occur over a long period of time and to a marked degree. 
Such conditions are evidenced by certain characteristics, including inability 
to maintain appropriate relationships with teachers or peers, inappropriate 
behavior or feelings under normal circumstances, a general pervasive mood 
of unhappiness or depression, or a tendency to develop physical symptoms 
or fears associated with personal or school-related problems.182 A child 
impacted by ACEs may certainly manifest behaviors that could fit several 
of the delineated characteristics. In fact, research on the impacts of ACEs 
evidences a probability of heightened fears under normal circumstances, 
and a child with heightened fight or flight responses could certainly have 
trouble maintaining relationships with peers or teachers.183 However, 
eligibility must include a professional assessment that evidences ACEs’ 
impacts to a “marked degree.”184 Thus, many children who are impacted by 
ACEs to some degree may not demonstrate behaviors that manifest severely 
enough to qualify under this category.185 
                                                     
179. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1) (2019). A student needs special education and related services when 
the student requires those services in order to receive an educational benefit from the educational 
program. Mr. I. ex rel. L.I., 480 F.3d 1; Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79 (1st 
Cir. 2012); Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D. ex rel. Brian D., 616 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2010).  
180. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i). 
181. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C., 258 F.3d 769, 775−76 (8th Cir. 2001). 
182. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i). Emotional Disturbance is a condition exhibiting one or more of the 
five enumerated characteristics “over a long period of time and to a marked degree.” Id. The 
characteristics are as follows: (i) “[a]n inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, 
sensory or health factors;” (ii) “[a]n inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal 
relationships with peers and teachers;” (iii) “[i]nappropriate types of behavior or feelings under 
normal circumstances;” (iv) “[a] general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression;” and (v) “[a] 
tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.” Id. 
183. Supra section I.A.2.  
184. Neither the IDEA statute nor its regulations at 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i) define the 
requirement that a student’s qualifying behavior manifest itself “to a marked degree.” OSEP has taken 
the position that it generally refers to the frequency, duration, or intensity of a student’s emotionally 
disturbed behavior in comparison to the behavior of his peers and can be indicative of either degree 
of acuity or pervasiveness. Letter from Judy A. Schrag, Dir., Office of Special Educ. Programs, to 
Anonymous (Aug. 11, 1989) (on file with author). 
185. While a medical or clinical diagnosis is generally not required in order to be eligible under the 
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Even assuming a student clearly exhibits characteristics delineated 
under emotional disturbance, the student must also demonstrate the need 
for special education and related services.186 The IDEA defines special 
education as specially designed instruction that adapts content, 
methodology, or delivery of instruction to address the needs of the child 
resulting from disability.187 Many ACEs-impacted students will need 
mental health supports, but not necessarily a modification to the delivery, 
content, or methodology of curriculum. Counseling, psychological, and 
social work services are generally considered related services, but not 
special education.188 If a child only needs related services, he or she does 
not meet the IDEA’s definition of a “child with a disability.”189 
Finally, researchers have long bemoaned the emotional disturbance 
category as overly broad and prone to subjective bias. Critics argue that 
African-American students are more likely to be misidentified with 
emotional disturbance due to culturally-insensitive evaluation 
procedures.190 Further, children labeled with emotional disturbance have 
among the poorest educational outcomes of any IDEA disability cohort.191 
Consequently, the value of striving for eligibility under this particular 
category of disability is dubious, at best. 
While there is certainly a path to eligibility and subsequent protections 
under all three disability rights laws, the IDEA is clearly the trickiest to 
navigate. Under each law, eligibility is considered on a case-by-case basis, 
                                                     
emotional disturbance category, states can issue their own regulations to further define IDEA 
disability categories. For instance, South Carolina requires evidence that a child is rated within the 
highest level of significance on a valid and reliable problem behavior rating scale by both a teacher 
and another adult knowledgeable of the student; a valid personality measure administered by 
psychologist or licensed psycho-educational specialist; and documentation that the student’s 
observable school problem behavior occurs at a “significantly different rate, intensity, or duration 
than [a] substantial majority of typical school peers.” MICK ZAIS, S.C. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE 
OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION AND ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION 
(SEED) (2011). 
186. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1). 
187. Id. § 300.39. 
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34; see also Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 
427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005). 
189. If a child has one of the disabilities identified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1), but only needs related 
services and not special education, the child is not a child with a disability under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.8(a)(2)(i). However, if the related service that the child requires is considered “special 
education” under state standards, the child will be eligible under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.8(a)(2)(ii). 
190. Nicole M. Oelrich, A New “Idea”: Ending Racial Disparity in the Identification of Students 
with Emotional Disturbance, 57 S.D. L. REV. 9, 28 (2012) (arguing that the IDEA’s definition of 
emotional disturbance contributes to the over-identification of African-American students under this 
category of disability). 
191. See Mary M. Wagner, Outcomes for Youths with Serious Emotional Disturbance in Secondary 
School and Early Adulthood, 5 FUTURE CHILD. 90, 97–99 (1995). 
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accounting for the reality that exposure to ACEs will impact children 
differently. For some, ACEs will lead to difficulty concentrating, 
managing stress, or conforming behavior to expected norms, but this will 
not be true for all. Schools, of course, only owe statutorily mandated 
duties to children who meet statutory definitions of disability. 
But school districts are also obligated to seek out those students who may 
have disabilities and determine whether they require special education or 
related services. The class-action lawsuits that seek school-wide reforms 
through Section 504 and the ADA claim that schools failed to live up to this 
duty. Because of schools’ failures to identify students with potential 
disabilities and provide them with necessary supports, plaintiffs argue that 
schools violated disability rights laws. The following section will turn to the 
practical questions presented by class-action lawsuits invoking Section 504 
and the ADA to demand systemic remedies for the failure to identify ACEs-
impacted students as individuals with disabilities. 
III. FLAWS IN THE LEGAL STRATEGY 
Attempting to use ACEs research as the foundation for systemic 
educational remedies runs into two categories of problems: legal and 
societal. To overcome legal hurdles, plaintiffs must demonstrate, first, that 
a school’s knowledge of a high probability of ACEs is enough to trigger 
the school’s child find obligation; and, second, that a school’s knowledge 
of this probability is enough to trigger programmatic changes affecting all 
students. To overcome societal problems, two difficult questions must be 
answered: (1) does opening the doors of eligibility wide enough to allow 
entire neighborhoods of children to be labeled “disabled” have unintended 
negative consequences?; and (2) is the risk of stigma outweighed by the 
benefits derived from disability rights protections? 
A. The Limits of Child Find 
Section 504 represented a “national commitment to eliminate the 
‘glaring neglect of the handicapped’” which caused them to “live among 
society ‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.’”192 Congress identified 
architectural and communication barriers as a central cause of that 
exclusion.193 But Congress also made clear that agencies “charged with 
administering the Act had substantial leeway to explore areas in which 
                                                     
192. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985) (first quoting 118 CONG. REC. 526 (1972) 
(statement of Sen. Percy); and then quoting 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Vanik)). 
193. Timothy M. Cook, The Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue 
Burdens under Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1471 (1987). 
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discrimination against the handicapped posed particularly significant 
problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such discrimination.”194 In 
the context of education, that meant not only prohibiting discrimination, 
but also affirmatively welcoming students with disabilities into public 
schools. Thus, the statute contains a “location and notification” regulation 
that directs schools to find children in their respective communities who 
may have disabilities. 195 Courts often refer to this obligation as “child 
find” and liken it to a similar obligation found in the IDEA.196 
Section 504’s child find mandate is actually driven by two regulations: 
the location and notification regulation197 (directed at community-wide 
responsibilities) and the “evaluation and placement” regulation198 
(directed at an individualized obligation). Class-action suits seeking 
reforms under disability rights laws rest on schools’ child find 
obligations.199 Plaintiffs claim that school districts shirked this duty by 
failing to properly identify ACEs-impacted students as individuals with 
disabilities. However, as the following section illustrates, there are limits 
to Section 504’s child find mandate that make class actions based on 
ACEs exposure tenuous at best. 
1. Child Find: The Obligation to the Community 
Section 504’s “location and notification” regulation tasks schools with 
providing the community, and specifically parents, notice of the law’s 
protections for children with disabilities.200 Courts generally hold that 
expansive messaging through posting on websites, newspapers, and in 
relevant offices, as well as sending notices to parents of school-aged 
children, is sufficient to meet this type of community-based obligation.201 
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Education has given school districts 
wide latitude in executing the community-wide child find obligation.202 
                                                     
194. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 304 n.24 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 40–41, 56 (1974)). 
195. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (2019). 
196. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111. 
197. Id. § 104.32. 
198. Id. § 104.35. 
199. See infra Part IV.  
200. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (location and notification) (“A recipient that operates a public elementary 
or secondary education program or activity shall annually: (a) Undertake to identify and locate every 
qualified handicapped person residing in the recipient’s jurisdiction who is not receiving a public 
education; and (b) Take appropriate steps to notify handicapped persons and their parents or guardians 
of the recipient’s duty under this subpart.”). 
201. P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009). 
202. Letter to Veir,  20 I.D.E.L.R. 864 (Office for Civil Rights, Southern Div., Dallas (Texas), Dec. 
1, 1993) (stating “[t]here are many means available including notices to private schools, state and 
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The plain language of the regulation only tasks schools with identifying 
persons who are not currently in public school and who may have rights 
under the act.203 It provides no guidance regarding how schools are to 
undertake this identification.204 As to students with disabilities currently 
in school, the regulation imparts a duty to “take appropriate steps to 
notify” those students, and their guardians, of their rights.205 It does not 
demand that schools take any steps beyond notification.206 For instance, it 
does not explicitly task schools with evaluating children suspected of 
having disabilities to determine whether they would qualify for services. 
However, the meaning of child find has evolved since the passage of 
Section 504 to include a duty to an individualized child who is suspected 
of having a disability. Courts often cite to the location and notification 
regulation for support of a broad child find duty that includes an obligation 
to evaluate individual students suspected of having a disability. However, 
the support for this individualized duty is contained in a separate 
regulation, discussed next.207 
2. Child Find: The Obligation to the Individual 
The Department of Education points to Section 504’s “evaluation and 
placement” regulation as the catalyst for a school’s duty to identify an 
individual child who may have a disability.208 This regulation obligates 
schools to find individual children who, due to a disability, are “believed 
to need special education or related services” and directs schools to 
complete an evaluation of such students before “taking any action with 
respect to the initial placement of the person in regular or special 
education.”209 Importantly, both the plain language of the regulation and 
agency interpretation limit the obligation to students who may need 
                                                     
local agencies, and notices placed in newspapers”). 
203. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. Under an even more restrictive reading of Regulation 34 C.F.R. § 104.32, schools only 
have the duty to notify those “qualified handicapped persons” who are not receiving a public 
education of their rights under the statute. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
208. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35; see also Dear Colleague ADA Letter, supra note 125; Attending Public 
Elementary, supra note 125, at Q9 (“A school district must conduct an evaluation of any individual 
who because of a disability ‘needs or is believed to need’ special education or related services.” 
(quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.35)). 
209. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35. 
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“special education or related services.”210 But, courts and agency 
interpretations of this regulation do not always align with each other. 
Courts interpreting Section 504’s child find reach have held that 
schools must refer a child suspected of having a disability for an 
evaluation to determine eligibility.211 This duty is triggered upon schools 
being “reasonably suspect[]” of disability.212 The law does not explicitly 
set forth what would constitute “reasonable suspicion” in this context, and 
thus, courts make case-by-case determinations.213 Generally, courts have 
held that schools can be liable for violating child find when they knew or 
reasonably should have known of disability.214 
The U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR)215 is 
more nuanced in its interpretation and instructs: 
When a school is aware of a student’s disability, or has reason to 
suspect a student has a disability, and the student needs or is believed 
to need special education or related services, it would be a violation 
of Section 504 if the school delays or denies the evaluation.216 
                                                     
210. Id.; see also Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q9; Dear Colleague ADA Letter, 
supra note 125. 
211.  D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (“‘School districts have a 
continuing obligation under the IDEA and § 504’—called ‘Child Find’—’to identify and evaluate all 
students who are reasonably suspected of having a disability under the statutes.’” (citing P.P. ex rel. 
Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Distr., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009)); D.G. v. Somerset Hills 
Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496 (D.N.J. 2008) (refusing to dismiss IDEA-alternative § 504 claim 
for student with depressive disorder and finding “[i]n establishing a [Section 504] claim, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the defendants knew or should have known about the disability”); see also 
Zirkel, supra note 114, at 575. 
212. P.P. ex rel. Michael P., 585 F.3d at 738 (“School districts have a continuing obligation under 
the IDEA and § 504 to identify and evaluate all students who are reasonably suspected of having a 
disability under the statutes.” (citing Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 
(3d Cir. 1999), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), as recognized in D.F. v. 
Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also Nathanson v. Med. Coll. 
of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs must prove a school knew or should 
have been reasonably expected to know about plaintiff’s disability in order to establish liability under 
Section 504). 
213. Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1381 (“Neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the regulations specif[y] 
what notification is necessary to adequately inform a recipient of a person’s handicap or what 
constitutes awareness of a handicap.”). 
214. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 
486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]o be liable, defendants ‘must know or be reasonably expected to 
know of’ E.J.’s disability.” (citing Nathanson, 926 F.2d 1368, 1381 (3d Cir.1991))). 
215. OCR is the enforcement arm of the U.S. Department of Education and has the authority to 
enforce several Federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in programs that receive federal 
funding from the Department of Education, including Section 504 and Title II of the ADA. About 
OCR, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE  CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
aboutocr.html [https://perma.cc/FM4N-VGNR]. 
216. PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 162, at 12 (emphasis added). 
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It bases this interpretation on the combined duties in both the location and 
notification and evaluation and placement regulations.217 
OCR indicates that schools’ knowledge of an existing disability may not 
always trigger the need to evaluate if the child does not need special 
education or related services.218 Violations of Section 504’s child find 
mandate occur where schools either knew of the need for an evaluation 
through a request from a parent or through its own observations indicating 
that a student has an impairment which impacts academic or behavioral 
performance.219 In guidance documents, OCR explains, “[t]he Section 504 
regulation does not set out specific circumstances that trigger the obligation 
to conduct an evaluation; the decision to conduct an evaluation is governed 
by the individual circumstances in each case.”220 Consequently, agency 
guidance suggests liability for child find only attaches when a school should 
have been reasonably aware of a disability that requires special education 
or related services, and not—as some courts interpret—an obligation to 
evaluate with knowledge of disability alone. 
Finally, Section 504’s child find directive requires schools to refer for 
evaluation students suspected of having disabilities that require “special 
education” or “related services,” but fails to define either term. The IDEA 
suggests that “special education” means specially designed instruction 
adapted to an individual child’s needs, and “related services” encompass 
almost anything needed to help a student with a disability to access 
FAPE.221 Thus, schools must think in broad terms when seeking out 
students who may require supports and services.222 
                                                     
217. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32, 104.35 (2019); U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FAQS, supra note 22 ( FAQ #34). 
218. Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q12. At the same time, academic success or 
failure is not the only trigger requiring a need to evaluate. Id. at Q9 (“[G]rades alone are an insufficient 
basis upon which to determine whether a student has a disability. Moreover, they may not be the 
determinative factor in deciding whether a student with a disability needs special education or related 
aids or services.”). 
219. Valley Oaks (CA) Charter Sch., 115 L.R.P. 52093 (Office for Civil Rights, W. Div., Ca., June 
29, 2015); Aurora (CO) Pub. Sch., 61 I.D.E.L.R. 83 (Office for Civil Rights, W. Div., Co., Jan. 14, 
2013).  
220. Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q9. 
221. The IDEA defines special education as “specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, 
to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012), and “related 
services” to mean “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive 
services . . . designed to enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate public education.” 
§ 1401(26). The list of IDEA’s related services enumerated in 34 C.F.R. § 300.34 is not exhaustive. 
222. For example, related services can include counseling services, transportation, and orientation 
and mobility services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34; see also PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE, supra 
note 162. 
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3. Child Find: The Implications for ACEs 
Science convincingly demonstrates that many children who have 
experienced ACEs may suffer long-term effects, but does not conclusively 
demonstrate that all will. Thus, in the context of ACEs, the question is: 
when is a school deemed to have “reasonable suspicion” of a disability 
triggering the need to evaluate? The Compton and Havasupai students 
argued that schools must begin an evaluation process once they are aware 
of the existence of ACEs, and thus, students should be assessed for 
eligibility purely based on living in a certain community.223 In effect, their 
claim attempts to broaden eligibility to include exposure to ACEs itself, 
regardless of the effects of such exposure. 
If mere exposure to ACEs is enough to trigger the child find mandate, 
then entire neighborhoods of children would need to undergo evaluations 
as part of a public-school enrollment process. The Compton and 
Havasupai litigants argue that Section 504’s child find obligation requires 
precisely that—evaluations to determine whether children in crime ridden 
and impoverished communities need special education or related services. 
But while the science around ACEs points to a broader understanding of 
what may be a qualifying disability, Section 504’s child find obligation 
contains some limiting principles. 
First, Section 504 does not task schools with finding all students who 
may have a disability, but rather only those students who may have a 
disability that requires special education or related services in order to 
ensure FAPE.224 The root of Section 504’s FAPE mandate is to ensure 
equality of educational access.225 Schools must identify students with 
disabilities so that they can ensure educational access that is equal to their 
peers. For example, a student with a hearing impairment who is able to 
understand one hundred percent of what is being said through the use of 
a hearing aid does not require special education or related services. Thus, 
even though the student with a hearing impairment would be protected by 
Section 504 and the ADA’s anti-discrimination provisions, the school has 
no duty to find or evaluate the child because they require no special 
education or related services.226 
                                                     
223. The Compton plaintiffs were not arguing that “complex trauma” should be recognized as a 
new category of disability, but rather that exposure to traumatic events chronically impacts students 
regardless of whether an underlying medically diagnosable disability is found. P.P. Complaint, supra 
note 9; ¶¶ 1–13; Stephen C. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 310–316. 
224. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35; see also PARENT & EDUCATOR RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 162. 
225. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33. 
226. Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125, at Q11. 
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Second, while a “qualified individual with a disability” may be 
interpreted broadly, schools are limited in their obligation to those 
students by the definition of FAPE. Section 504’s FAPE standard is 
defined comparatively—schools must design educational programs to 
meet the individual educational needs of qualified students with 
disabilities as adequately as their nondisabled peers.227 A need for “special 
education” may be triggered when a student needs something different 
than what is offered to all other students in order to have equal access to 
the curriculum. The same is true for “related services”—supportive 
services needed for equal access to the curriculum. In its guidance on 
Section 504, the Department of Education states that academic struggles 
are not the only signal of a need for special education or related services. 
Rather, behavioral struggles, communication inhibitors, or anything 
preventing a child from accessing curriculum as equally as nondisabled 
peers may signal a need to evaluate for Section 504 eligibility.228 
Consequently, while schools are obligated to identify students with 
eligible disabilities, Section 504 only mandates they engage in that task 
with an eye towards students who require something extra (special 
education or related services) to access their education as effectively as 
their non-disabled peers.229 Importantly, it does not ask that schools 
optimize a child’s educational experience or ensure a particular outcome, 
but only that it provide equal access to education.230 Arguably, for 
children living in violent and impoverished neighborhoods, the stress of 
life in this environment alone would not signal a need to evaluate them 
under Section 504. Rather, students must demonstrate the inability to 
grasp academic content or conform behavior to school-based norms as 
effectively as one’s peers. 
That being said, the science linking ACEs to a heightened response to 
stress and perceived threats may lower the threshold for when schools are 
sufficiently on notice of a suspected disability. For instance, a school 
operating in a community where high incidences of ACEs are probable may 
be on notice of a child with a disability when a student often violates  school 
                                                     
227. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33. 
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012); 154 CONG. REC. S8342, S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) 
(statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 3406, The Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008); see also Attending Public Elementary, supra note 125125, at Q7 & Q9. 
229. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.35, 104.33. 
230. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33; Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 420 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Therefore, in 
some situations, a school system may have to provide special education to a handicapped individual 
in order to meet the educational needs of a handicapped student ‘as adequately as the needs’ of a 
nonhandicapped student, as required by § 104.33(b)(1). Provision of special education under this 
regulation, however, would exceed the scope of aid authorized by the Rehabilitation Act if this relief 
called for accommodations beyond those necessary to eliminate discrimination.”). 
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rules or seems unable to conform behavior to acceptable norms. Whereas a 
student without known exposures to ACEs who is often disciplined may not 
trigger the child find obligation. Thus, an adequate understanding of ACEs 
may prompt earlier referrals for suspicion of disability in children who 
exhibit problematic behaviors.231 But even school districts with knowledge 
of this science may not necessarily run afoul of Section 504’s child find 
requirements until students begin demonstrating academic or behavioral 
struggles. Essentially, child find is not triggered by exposure to ACEs alone, 
but rather still requires reasonable suspicion of a disability requiring special 
education or related services.232 
Ultimately, child find’s reasonable suspicion standard places 
considerable onus on teachers who serve on the front-lines of the 
identification process. While teachers are not meant to be experts in 
disabilities, by virtue of their daily classroom experiences, they acquire 
specialized knowledge about typical child development. It is this 
knowledge that allows them to spot variances from the norm. Once they 
are aware of a variance, it is their job, with the help of parents and other 
school members, to attempt to figure out the root cause of the child’s 
struggle as well as identify potential interventions. At a certain point, it is 
also a teacher’s responsibility to recognize that specialized assistance may 
be necessary and refer a child for an evaluation to uncover the root of a 
child’s challenges. Schools that have weak referral systems or schools that 
neglect to regularly intervene with struggling students may violate child 
find. But the trigger for the evaluation is not knowledge of the disability 
itself, rather it is the child’s academic or behavioral struggles.233 
Behavioral struggles will be apparent whether the child is eventually 
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, PTSD, or is suffering from the effects 
of ACEs. What may have changed is a school’s need to evaluate for a 
disability upon any sign of behavioral challenges in a population of 
students with probable exposure to ACEs. Rather than assume the 
behavior is simply the child’s unwillingness to follow the rules, science 
may dictate that the appropriate assumption should be to explore exposure 
to ACEs and any resulting impacts. The trouble with such an assumption, 
even though based in the science of ACEs, is that it has the potential to 
stigmatize poor communities of color.234 This unintended, but potentially 
dangerous consequence, will be explored more fully in section III.D.  
                                                     
231. See supra section I.A.2. 
232. See supra section I.A.2. 
233. See supra section I.A.2. 
234. See infra section III.D. 
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B. The Limits of Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) 
While it may be true that many students exposed to ACEs require 
additional supports to meaningfully access education, it is certain that not 
all do. Not all children impacted by ACEs will respond in the same way. 
Not all will need interventions, and those that do will not all need the same 
interventions. Disability rights laws demand that schools find out which 
students actually require additional supports and provide targeted services 
to meet individual needs.235 Thus, once a child meets the definition of an 
“individual with a disability” under either Section 504 or the ADA, the 
inquiry shifts to what affirmative actions must schools take in order to 
ensure equal educational opportunities.236 This question is answered by 
the FAPE regulation. 
1. Clarifying Section 504’s FAPE Obligation 
All elementary and secondary school students who qualify under 
Section 504 and the ADA are entitled to FAPE, defined as “the provision 
of regular or special education and related aids and services that [] are 
designed to meet individual educational needs of [students with 
disabilities] as adequately as the needs of [nondisabled students].”237 
Notably, not all students with disabilities will need supports or services, 
but they are all still protected by the laws’ broader anti-discrimination 
mandates.238 Courts and agencies interpret FAPE’s limitations differently, 
but both agree that the FAPE regulation requires a targeted approach 
directed at an individual student’s needs. 
                                                     
235. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32, 104.35. 
236. Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012)) (“ADA”); Id. §§ 104.4, 104.34; 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7) (2019); see also Weber, supra note 3535, at 24. 
237. Section 504 obligates schools to “provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified 
handicapped person” who resides in the school district. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (2019). While the 
ADA does not specifically address the provision of FAPE, OCR has noted that a district’s obligations 
under Section 504 and the ADA “are generally the same.” Nick J. Rahall, House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C., 21 I.D.E.L.R. 575, at 1 (Office for Civil Rights, E. Div. of Philadelphia, June 22, 
1994) (on file with author). As such, a district must provide FAPE to students with disabilities to 
comply with the ADA. Id.; see also Naco (AZ) Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 23, 107 L.R.P. 39965 (Office for 
Civil Rights, W.D., Az., Oct. 2, 2006); Issaquah (WA) Sch. Dist. No. 411, 40 I.D.E.L.R. 53 (Office 
for Civil Rights, W. Div., Wash. May 2, 2003); Pleasant Valley (CA) Elementary Sch. Dist., 32 
I.D.E.L.R. 6 (Office for Civil Rights, W. Div., Cal., June 29, 1999).  
238. Individuals covered by Section 504 or the ADA are also protected from discrimination, 
retaliation and harassment, regardless of whether or not they need special education or related 
services. 34 C.F.R.§§ 104.4, 104.21-104.23, 104.61; 28 C.F.R. § 35. 
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Agency’s interpretation of the FAPE regulation suggests schools must 
provide whatever supports are necessary to eliminate discrimination.239 
OCR points to the plain language of the regulation as guidance of 
Congress’s intent to make elementary and postsecondary schools 
accountable for meeting the educational needs of their students equally.240 
Consequently, OCR instructs that financial considerations should not 
factor in the FAPE analysis.241 Rather, the only consideration should be 
whether or not the educational support or related service is necessary to 
eliminate discrimination.242 Under this reading, substantial adjustments 
may be required to meet the needs of students with disabilities as 
adequately as their peers.243 
Courts, however, have interpreted the FAPE obligation to mean that “a 
school district must reasonably accommodate the needs of the 
handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful participation in educational 
activities and meaningful access to educational benefits.”244 The 
“reasonable accommodations” language is borrowed from the ADA’s 
implementing regulations which state a public entity must “make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability.”245 An exception to this mandate applies where the public entity 
can demonstrate that making the modifications would “fundamentally 
alter the nature of the services, program, or activity.”246 Clearly, the ADA 
regulation places limits on schools’ obligations, instructing that schools 
must only provide that which is reasonable and setting aside “fundamental 
                                                     
239. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)–(d). 
240. Letter to Perry A. Zirkel, 20 I.D.E.L.R. 134 (Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Aug. 
23, 1993). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 2 (“If a school district is meeting the needs of children without disabilities to a greater 
extent than it is meeting the needs of children with disabilities, discrimination is occurring.”). 
243. Id.  
244. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 274 (3d Cir. 2014) (“However, § 504 does 
not mandate ‘substantial’ changes to the school’s programs, and courts ‘should be mindful of the need 
to strike a balance between the rights of the student and [his or her] parents and the legitimate financial 
and administrative concerns of the [s]chool [d]istrict . . . mere administrative or fiscal convenience 
does not constitute a sufficient justification for providing separate or different services to a 
handicapped child.” (citing Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2012))). 
245. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2019). 
246. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990). 
Confusion about the reasonable accommodation limitation may also stem from separate subparts of 
Section 504, which do contain such language. For instance, part B which covers employers contains 
a reasonable accommodations limit and part E, which covers postsecondary schools, states when a 
recipient can demonstrate that an academic requirement is essential to the program of instruction a 
failure to modify will not be regarded as discriminatory. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.12, 104.44 (2019). 
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alterations” as unreasonable and thus, unwarranted. By reading 
“reasonableness” into the FAPE standard, courts put limits on schools’ 
obligations to confer FAPE that are not contained in the plain language of 
the regulation.247 
While both the FAPE regulation and the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodations regulations apply to public schools, the ADA’s 
regulation should not be read as imposing limits onto FAPE.248 Rather, 
the FAPE standard is limited by what is needed to ensure equality. 
Importantly, nothing in either law demands that schools provide 
“potential-maximizing education,” but rather both task schools with 
providing supports and services that give students with disabilities “the 
same access to benefits as all other public education students.”249 
Essentially, Section 504 and the ADA do not require schools to develop 
flawless or even optimal educational programs; rather, both laws suggest 
that a reasonable plan designed to meet the needs of students with 
disabilities as adequately as their non-disabled peers would suffice.250 
Because courts often impose a reasonable accommodations analysis to 
claims brought under Section 504 and the ADA, the following section will 
discuss ACE claims within the context of both FAPE and reasonable 
accommodations. It illustrates how, in either context, class-based 
remedies for system-wide programmatic changes stretch the contours of 
those obligations. 
2. The Impossibility of Class-Based Remedies for Programmatic 
Change 
Quite clearly, both laws put limits on how far schools must go in their 
provision of disability supports.251 Schools only need to provide those 
supports necessary to eliminate discrimination. Within the context of 
education, this is defined as offering students FAPE. FAPE, in turn, is 
rooted in a school district’s obligation to an individual student. Class-
                                                     
247. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 274. 
248. 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (“Rule of interpretation. Except as otherwise provided in this part, this 
part shall not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791 (2012)) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies 
pursuant to that title.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 130(b)(7) (Comments by Dep’t of Justice); 28 C.F.R. ch. 
1, pt. 35, app. B, at 673 (“[T]he House Judiciary Committee Report directs the Attorney General to 
include those specific requirements in the Title II regulation the extent they do not conflict with the 
regulations implementing section 504.”). 
249. J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2000). 
250. K.K. ex rel. L.K. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Schs., 590 F. App’x 148, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2014); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 104.33.   
251. 28 C.F.R. § 35.164. 
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based litigation stretches the contours of this obligation by forcing FAPE 
to into a group-based remedy, something the language of the law clearly 
does not contemplate. For a class of plaintiffs to prevail on a claim of 
systemwide accommodations under Section 504 or the ADA, they would 
need to show that such accommodations are required to eliminate 
discrimination. In other words, the system-wide remedy is necessary to 
meet their needs as adequately as those of their non-disabled peers. 
Because the heart of a systemic claim for services under Section 504 is 
situated in a denial of FAPE, the remedy sought (systemic) conflicts with 
the nature of Section 504’s FAPE obligation (individualized). Section 504 
defines FAPE individually: the statute directs schools to design regular or 
special education services to meet the “individual educational needs” of 
students with disabilities as adequately as those without.252 It further 
mandates that schools conduct individual evaluations of each child 
suspected of needing special education or related services in order to 
assess individual needs and as a precursor to designing an appropriate 
plan.253 By its very definition, the FAPE obligation must be individually 
tailored to each child. While a group of children may be denied FAPE, the 
remedy must be individual in nature because the very definition of FAPE 
is tied to an individual child.254 The law clearly disfavors a one-size-fits-
all approach. Rather than a system wide remedy to address FAPE, Section 
504 requires an individualized education program suitable to a particular 
child’s disability-based needs. 
Because Section 504 requires schools to ensure meaningful access 
through FAPE and FAPE is, in turn, an individualized comparative 
standard, schools arguably cannot fulfill this obligation with a collective 
systemic remedy. Rather, schools must fulfill this obligation to each 
individual child. Thus, while a school may have denied FAPE to a class 
of students by failing to conduct evaluations and design effective 
education programs, this failure cannot be remedied by a one-size-fits-all 
school-wide reform. Rather, the remedy called for by Section 504’s FAPE 
regulation would be to ensure individual evaluations of each child 
suspected of having a disability and to ensure the development of 
accommodations, including special education where needed, to guarantee 
equality within the educational program. 
While Section 504 may support systemic remedies that relate to process 
including, effective procedural safeguards and comprehensive 
evaluations, such systemic remedies are not appropriate when the 
substance of the educational program is at issue. The ineffectiveness of 
                                                     
252. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33. 
253. Id. § 104.35. 
254. Id. § 104.33. 
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system-wide substantive remedies is illustrated through a simple 
hypothetical. Assume that rather than ACEs, a school district served a 
neighborhood of children with varying levels of vision impairment—a 
more objectively measurable disability. Once the school is aware that 
some percentage of its students are visually impaired, the appropriate 
response is not to offer every child the same prescription of glasses, make 
the font larger in all textbooks, or offer guide dogs to all children. Of 
course, put in this context, such broad and systemic responses sound 
absurd. Quite obviously, the appropriate response is to screen each child 
to determine the degree of impairment for that child and provide 
individualized supports or services. Similarly, system-wide 
accommodations meant to address the varied impacts of ACEs are just as 
ill-suited to the task. Rather, in both scenarios, the logical first step is an 
individualized determination of the disability’s effects on a particular 
child—not system-wide accommodations. 
Were courts to apply a reasonable accommodations analysis, a claim 
for system-wide programmatic changes would still fall flat. Schools could 
claim such remedies amount to a fundamental alteration to the nature of 
the school’s program. Indeed, several courts have signaled a deference 
towards schools when accommodations cause financial or administrative 
burdens on school systems.255 Not all, but many program-wide changes 
could trigger issues of both cost and administration. Further, the very 
nature of a systemic remedy is to change the structure of the status quo, 
which may be required to avoid discrimination at least in some cases.256 
For instance, the Compton Plaintiffs’ Section 504 claim centered on three 
district-wide remedies: (1) training teachers to recognize effects of 
complex trauma and teach students self-regulation and social-emotional 
skills; (2) developing restorative justice practices; and (3) ensuring 
school-wide mental health supports.257 Given what programmatic 
structures are currently available in Compton schools, it is easy to see how 
the school district could successfully argue that such structural changes 
represent a fundamental and costly change to existing school programs. 
Determining whether school-wide modification rises to the level of an 
unreasonable or “fundamental or substantial modification of its program 
or standards” will depend on a district’s current programmatic 
                                                     
255.  J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2000); Rothschild v. 
Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990).  
256. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). 
257. Compton plaintiffs proffered expert testimony alleging that school-wide interventions were 
the only effective way to ensure students with complex trauma would not be denied meaningful 
access. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, at 61. 
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offerings.258 Demands that schools change curricular content for all 
students based on the needs of some may be met with fierce resistance 
from schools. Further, such requests are likely to face significant 
challenges with courts known for their deference to school officials 
around matters of educational policy.259 In essence, such demands make 
an end run around the traditional educational decision-makers and ask 
courts to effectuate changes to educational policies. Courts will likely be 
exceedingly leery of doing so when such changes not only impact all 
students, but also seem to be of the type traditionally left in the realm of 
school officials and elected school board members. 
For instance, the Compton litigants demanded new curriculum (social 
emotional learning and self-regulation skills) be taught to all students as 
a system-wide accommodation.260 Yet, this type of remedy is the type of 
educational policy decision courts have historically been the most 
uncomfortable making.261 Indeed, by mandating this change, courts 
permit disability rights laws to dictate curricular content for all students, 
potentially altering a school’s pedagogical approach to education. On the 
other hand, if school districts have already begun to incorporate such 
practices, courts may not balk at ordering improvements in existing 
programs as such action would not equate to a fundamental change.262 
While disability rights laws may provide protections for students 
impacted by ACEs, class-action lawsuits that seek systemic remedies 
based on a theory that disability is more prevalent in certain 
neighborhoods fail to recognize the limits of the laws they invoke. Both 
the ADA and Section 504 require schools to provide meaningful access to 
education, but this obligation is inextricably linked to a student’s ability 
to gain access to statutory protections establishing their status as a 
“qualified individual with a disability” and their disability-based needs. 263 
Fundamentally, these lawsuits skip the important steps of identifying 
who those children are and accounting for the individualized impacts of 
their disabilities before demanding appropriate relief. Quite clearly, not 
every child exposed to a traumatic experience will respond in the same 
way. Thus, even if children in the same neighborhood are all exposed to 
community violence (a recognized adverse childhood experience), their 
                                                     
258. Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999). 
259. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 988, 
1001 (2017); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207–08 (1982). 
260. P.P. Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 6. 
261.  Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 1001; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207–08. 
262. K.N. v. Gloucester City Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 3d 334, 355 (D.N.J. 2019) (finding that a 
requested accommodation could not be a fundamental alteration to a school’s program where the 
plaintiff had previously received the accommodation). 
263. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
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reactions to that exposure will vary. The supports, accommodations, or 
other educational services they may need as a result of this adversity may 
vary as well. Essentially, these parties ask courts to assume that all 
students who have experienced trauma require the same set of 
accommodations in order to meaningfully access education. The science 
supporting effects of ACEs on brain development is both reliable and 
compelling, but even accepting the research as valid, it fails to sufficiently 
inform courts about the impact on any individual child. And when the 
laws’ substantive protections are bound to the individual child’s needs, 
such class-based suits seek an impossible remedy. 
C. Additional Legal Hurdles 
Beyond the limitations tied to the FAPE and reasonable accommodations 
regulations, several additional hurdles stand in the way of successfully 
leveraging disability laws as agents of educational reform. While all can 
likely be overcome, they are worth briefly noting as they help present a 
clearer picture of the challenges placed on class-based relief. 
The first obstacle arises from IDEA’s exhaustion clause.264 The IDEA 
requires that plaintiffs who seek relief available under the IDEA must 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit under any other law, 
including the ADA and Section 504.265 The only exception is when the 
remedy sought is not centered on a denial of IDEA’s FAPE requirements.266 
Whether an exception also exists for denials of FAPE under Section 504 is 
unclear.267 Thus, plaintiffs bringing a Section 504 FAPE claim may need to 
convince a court that the IDEA’s exhaustion clause does not apply due to 
the distinctions in FAPE obligations under each law. Should that argument 
fail, plaintiffs may still prevail under one of the exceptions to administrative 
exhaustion—most likely by claiming that the remedy sought is a systemic 
change incapable of individual relief.268 
                                                     
264. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012). 
265. Id. 
266. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2017) (holding IDEA 
exhaustion not required when the remedy sought is not for the denial of a free appropriate public 
education (FAPE)). 
To determine whether a plaintiff in a suit brought under a statute other than the [IDEA] seeks 
relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), such that the plaintiff is 
required to exhaust IDEA’s remedies, a court should look to the crux, or the gravamen, of the 
plaintiff’s complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading. 
Id. at 743. 
267. Id. at 747. 
268. D.R. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 
2017).   
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The second obstacle to class-based relief centers on the exceedingly 
murky court interpretations of the intent standard required for Section 504 
and ADA claims. Many circuits have held that when plaintiffs seek non-
monetary remedies, such as the declaratory and injunctive relief sought in 
ACEs-based class actions, they need not prove intentional 
discrimination.269 In these circuits, plaintiffs need only prove 
discriminatory effects resulting from their status as an individual with a 
disability.270 However, a few circuits require plaintiffs to prove an 
“aggravated denial of reasonable accommodation,” which means a 
showing of bad faith or gross departure from professional judgment in all 
Section 504 and ADA claims.271 While many scholars have criticized this 
heightened standard,272 several circuits continue to insist on it in claims 
alleging non-intentional discrimination.273 Consequently, plaintiffs 
seeking class-based relief, even when alleging non-intentional harms, may 
need to prove the school districts’ policies or practices amounted to a 
gross departure from professional judgement.274 
Finally, to successfully allege that a school district failed to implement 
a regulation, plaintiffs must first demonstrate that the cited regulation is 
privately enforceable. As a general principle, regulations are only 
privately enforceable if their requirements fall within the scope of the 
prohibition contained within the statute.275 The Supreme Court has long-
                                                     
269. Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 B.C. 
L. REV. 1417, 1433 (2015). 
270. Perry Zirkel, Do Courts Require a Heightened, Intent Standard for Students’ Section 504 and 
ADA Claims Against School Districts? 47 J.L. & EDUC. 109 (2018) (charting differences in courts’ 
approaches to requiring intent in disability discrimination cases brought under Section 504 and Title II 
of the ADA). 
271. Weber, supra note 269, at 1456 (identifying courts that impose a higher standard when 
analyzing claims for reasonable accommodations brought by students in schools); see also D.R., 2017 
WL 4348818, at *9 (holding that while “a mere disagreement in FAPE is not sufficient to show 
discrimination,” plaintiffs’ allegation that school district’s professional judgment in oversight of its 
programs, and the allocation of necessary resources have caused discriminatory effects may rise to 
the level of bad faith or gross departure from professional judgment). 
272. Weber, supra note 269, at 1417; see also Zirkel, supra note 270, at 109. 
273. Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982); see Weber, supra note 269, at 
1433. 
274. See Weber, supra note 269, at 1456. These ACEs based class-action lawsuits have thus far 
proceeded under theories of nonintentional discrimination and have sought non-monetary relief. 
Plaintiffs allege a failure to identify students with disabilities and failure to provide reasonable 
accommodations. Neither of these claims allege that schools intended to harm or discriminate against 
students with disabilities, but rather that the effect of the school’s actions or inactions resulted in a 
denial of meaningful access to education for students impacted by ACEs. To remedy this 
discrimination, plaintiffs demanded declaratory or injunctive relief. See supra section I.C.  
275. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001). The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
to mean that regulations can only be enforced through the private right of action contained in a statute 
when they “authoritatively construe” the statute; regulations that go beyond a construction of the 
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held that Section 504 itself establishes an implied private right of action 
allowing victims of prohibited discrimination, exclusion, or denial of 
benefits to seek “the full panoply of remedies, including equitable relief 
and compensatory damages.”276 Lawsuits proceeding under a theory of 
ACEs as disability invoke Section 504’s FAPE and child find regulations 
and, thus, must demonstrate that each regulation is privately 
enforceable.277 Recent court opinions suggest they will likely succeed  
in both. 278 
D. The Societal Cost 
There is no question that students impacted by poverty, community 
violence, instability, and other ACEs face significant challenges when it 
comes to overcoming the impacts of such disadvantage.279 But, class-
action suits seeking systemic services for students exposed to ACEs 
essentially claim that all students in poor, minority neighborhoods are 
disabled and require something different in order to meaningfully access 
educational opportunities. As several scholars have illustrated, painting 
with such a broad brush risks further pathologizing predominately poor 
and minority communities as dysfunctional and damaged.280 Historically, 
false and damaging beliefs about race and poverty have resulted in 
policies that stigmatize African-Americans and disproportionately 
oppress low-income communities of color.281 A second problem with such 
suits is they incentivize a broad remedy which may be effective for some, 
but not all students, at the expense of a remedy tailored to meet individual 
student needs. 
                                                     
statute’s prohibitions do not fall within the implied private right of action, even if those regulations 
are valid. Id. at 284. 
276. Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1987). 
277. The Havasupai case filed claims for violations of location and notification, procedural 
safeguards, and FAPE. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 50–62, 
Stephen C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., No. 3:17-cv-08004-SPL, 2018 WL 1871457 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 
2018). 
278. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008); Stephen C., 2018 WL 1871457, at *7. 
279. Burke et al., supra note 44, at 412–13. 
280.  Nancy E. Dowd, Straight Out of Compton: Developmental Equality and a Critique of the 
Compton School Litigation, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 199 (2017); Troutt, supra note 63, at 653–55 
(cautioning that policies meant to treat widespread psychological trauma could further cement the 
narrative that already exists associated poor black families with dysfunction). 
281. Troutt, supra note 63, at 653–55 (comparing the well-intentioned objective of systemic trauma 
interventions to the current system of child welfare laws and noting that, while child welfare laws 
were established for the protection of vulnerable children, “child welfare administration has given 
rise to consistent costs that fall disproportionately on the black poor . . . the costs include the stigma 
of being considered presumptively dysfunctional people”). 
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Consequently, the fight for access to disability rights protections for this 
particular group of students comes with significant risks. If children from 
poor communities are understood to be somehow broken or dysfunctional, 
in large part, because of their relationship to that community, we risk 
perpetuating invidious racial stereotypes leading school systems and 
educators to buy into a false narrative that all students from these 
communities are damaged. Time and again, research shows that teacher 
expectations of their students matter.282 And sadly, many teachers lower 
their academic expectations when students carry the label of requiring 
“special education.”283 While the same fate may not hold true for students 
who seek accommodations for effects of ACEs, there is little reason to think 
otherwise. The label of “trauma” or “complex trauma” will likely begin to 
cloak children or entire schools in assumptions about capability, resilience, 
and frailty. In some instances, such assumptions will not work at cross-
purposes and children will be able to achieve academic and emotional 
successes. But rest assured, there will also be times when teachers demand 
less of students with ACEs or assume they are capable of less because of 
the label itself. Of course, this result is inapposite to the very purpose for 
which disability rights laws were enacted. 
A second risk in requesting a system-wide response is inviting schools 
to implement broad remedies without looking more closely at the needs 
of individual students. In short, it fits all children from certain 
communities into one box without regard to their individual needs or 
capabilities. Some schools may quickly assume, by virtue of their student 
demographic, that a majority of their students suffer the impacts of ACEs 
and institute systemic accommodations. Such action will likely be 
overinclusive and risks prioritizing the collective response over individual 
needs. Other schools, again simply by virtue of student demographics, 
may assume that only a tiny percentage of their students have suffered the 
effects of trauma and may fail to attribute academic or social challenges 
to a potential unidentified disability that requires special education or 
accommodations. In either scenario certain students are not served 
according to their individual needs. 
Finally, such litigation effectively transforms disability rights laws into 
agents of educational reform and bypasses the legislative and democratic 
                                                     
282. Nicholas W. Papageorge, et al., Teacher Expectations Matter, I.Z.A. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 
10165 (2016) (DE), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp10165.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9LW-N2MK] 
(demonstrating evidence that teacher expectations affect students’ educational attainment and 
suggesting teacher expectations differ by racial groups in ways that disadvantage black students). 
283. Claire Raj, The Misidentification of Children with Disabilities: A Harm with No Foul, 48 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 373 (2016) (discussing the stigma associated with being a child with a disability 
including lowering of expectations for academic success from teachers as well as from students 
themselves). 
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systems currently in place to address education policy. Disability rights 
laws were enacted to ensure equal access to education which certainly 
includes the mandate to modify curriculum for an individual student 
where necessary to ensure meaningful access.284 Much less certain, 
however, is whether such laws can mandate curricular changes for an 
entire school. Education curriculum is normally dictated by the state, 
which typically designates such responsibility to local elected or 
appointed school boards.285 In this way, decisions about education policy 
and curriculum are at least in theory grounded in a democratic process.286 
Allowing disability laws to influence such decisions marks a seismic shift 
in the way these decisions are typically made in that it removes them from 
the democratic process. Certainly, history reveals that at times court 
intervention is necessary to force states to make necessary changes to 
educational policy.287 State legislatures currently underfunding public 
schools and failing to adequately educate students may need the pressure 
of litigation to force their hand.288 The point here is simply that disability 
laws were not enacted for this purpose, and careful consideration should 
be given to whether they should and can be used to bring about such 
broad-based changes. 
Notwithstanding the above concerns, disability law may have a central 
role to play in tackling the pervasive challenge ACEs present. The 
following Part will tackle two potential solutions to address the impacts 
of ACEs recognizing the limits of disability law and attempting to guard 
against over-identification of students as disabled. 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
Using Section 504 or the ADA as a class-based remedy to provide 
systemic changes in schools presents the proverbial problem of trying to 
fit a square peg in a round hole. The statutes simply do not have the 
capacity to allow for such a remedy. Essentially, litigants are seeking a 
systemic change to the educational program based on two assumptions. 
First, that there are students with as-yet unidentified disabilities in the 
school district, and second, that these students require school-wide 
programmatic changes in order to meaningfully access education. While 
                                                     
284. See supra section I.B. 
285. See generally SARAH M. STITZLEIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF ITS CITIZENS: SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
(2017). 
286. Id. 
287. Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and Its Impact on the Supreme 
Court’s Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9 (1992). 
288. John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 2351, 2354 (2004). 
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the research supporting ACEs may make those assumptions more likely 
than not for a large percentage of students, Section 504 and the ADA 
demand individualized determinations of disability that require special 
education or related services. The laws do not leave room for assumptions 
or probabilities. 
Moreover, class actions based on a theory of ACEs as a disability bring 
to light a tension between the harms of labeling entire communities of 
children as “disabled” by virtue of their membership in these very 
communities and the science that supports the idea that many, but not all, 
of these children suffer real emotional and physiological impacts because 
of their membership in this group. Attempting system-wide remedies for 
the whole group based on aggregate demographics of the group raises a 
problem that statistics literature refers to as the “ecological fallacy.”289 
This principle states it is statistically incorrect to assume that one person 
in a group resembles the average or typical traits of the group.290 In the 
context of the Compton class-action suit, selecting one student at random 
in the Compton school district does not provide any statistical confidence 
that the child will be any more likely than anyone else in Compton to be 
impacted by ACEs and require supportive services to access education. 
Thus, broad-based reforms run the risk of being overinclusive. Disability 
rights law currently guards against ecological fallacy by requiring 
individualized decisions based on each child’s unique needs.291 
Addressing a community’s need for services while guarding against the 
harms of overinclusion can be accomplished, but doing so requires both 
litigation and legislative strategies. The following section proposes two 
potential solutions that attempt to address both over-inclusion and a need 
for community-wide services. The first involves systematically litigating 
child find claims on behalf of students who clearly evidence impacts of 
ACEs with the goal of pressuring schools to adopt more efficient 
screening tools for ACEs. The second solution requires legislative action 
in the form of grant funding to support schoolwide trauma-informed 
services directed at schools that educate a significant percentage of 
students impacted by ACEs. 
A. Turning Individual Rights into Systemic Solutions 
Science reveals a tension between effectively meeting the needs of 
students impacted by ACEs and the limits of schools’ obligations under 
                                                     
289. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 218 (Paul J. Lavrakas ed., 2008). 
290. David Lubinski & Lloyd G. Humphreys, Seeing the Forest from the Trees: When Predicting 
the Behavior or Status of Groups, Correlate Means, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 363, 375 (1996). 
291. See supra section I.B. 
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disability rights laws. Advocates want early identification of these 
students and schoolwide supports for what they believe to be a widespread 
problem. But, disability rights laws only require schools to act upon 
reasonable suspicion of a disability that requires supports and call for 
individualized, not group, interventions.292 In order to bridge this gap 
between what the law requires and the research supporting ACEs’ wide-
spread impacts, advocates should focus on bringing a series of individual 
child find claims on behalf of those students impacted by ACEs who 
clearly demonstrate learning or behavioral struggles. By bringing a series 
of these claims, advocates force schools to meet the needs of individual 
students and begin laying the groundwork to evidence the pervasiveness 
of ACEs. Ultimately, when faced with the reality of mounting child find 
claims, schools will be more likely to adopt universal screening tools and 
implement systemic reforms, even when not legally required, in order to 
more efficiently address the extensive impacts of ACEs. 
Adopting this targeted approach could accomplish three important 
goals. First, it can pressure schools to voluntarily implement universal 
screening for ACEs-related impacts in order to provide supports to 
students who need them. Second, it would facilitate a more precise 
delivery of services that match individual student needs. Finally, once 
schools become aware of the breadth of ACEs within their student bodies, 
they may choose to implement schoolwide trauma-informed practices as 
a means of remedying widespread effects of ACEs, while still ensuring 
individualized services where needed. 
The recent Flint, Michigan litigation to remediate the effects of lead 
exposure provides useful insights that support this Article’s proposal.293 
In 2016, a class of students in Flint, Michigan brought suit under the 
IDEA, Section 504, Title II of the ADA, and state laws on behalf of 
approximately 30,000 school-age children residing in Flint.294 The 
plaintiffs shared the unfortunate incidence of prolonged exposure to 
elevated levels of lead in the public water.295 Lead exposure substantially 
increases the likelihood of cognitive-related disabilities.296 Thus, the 
representative plaintiff class claimed that as a result of this exposure, they 
                                                     
292. See supra sections III.A, III.B. 
293. See D.R. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-13694, 2017 WL 4348818 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 
2017). 
294. Id. at *1. 
295. Class Action Complaint at 7, D.R., 2017 WL 4348818.  
296. Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children Associated with the Flint 
Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk and Public Health Response, 106 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 283, 283 (2016); Bruce P. Lanphear et al., Low-Level Environmental Lead Exposure and 
Children’s Intellectual Function: An International Pooled Analysis, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 
894, 894 (2005). 
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required “community-wide early screening; timely referral for, and 
performance of, evaluations to determine whether they have a qualifying 
disability which makes them eligible for special education and related 
services.”297 The plaintiffs invoked both the IDEA as well as Section 504 
and Title II of the ADA, but the court’s ruling on their substantive claims 
focused mainly on the IDEA.298 While the case was ultimately settled, the 
plaintiffs’ claims survived a motion to dismiss.299 At that point, the 
plaintiffs were able reach a favorable settlement which dramatically 
improved child find procedures. The school district agreed to implement 
universal screening for potential impacts of lead exposure and facilitate 
comprehensive evaluations, including neuropsychological evaluations 
when needed.300 
The strategy in Flint to strengthen child find procedures offers an 
important path forward for students impacted by ACEs and suggests that 
improving identification processes, rather than demanding services, is the 
first step to reform. Lead exposure is clearly linked with disability, but 
exposure does not automatically equate to disability. As the Flint plaintiffs 
explained, exposure to lead may have significant detrimental impacts on 
learning or other cognitive and physiological impacts, but “it is impossible 
to predict in advance how lead will impact a specific individual.”301 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the plaintiffs succeeded because of 
the close nexus between exposure to lead and the eventual likelihood of a 
disability requiring special education.302 The school district believed it 
highly likely that many of Flint’s lead exposed children would eventually 
meet IDEA’s eligibility parameters. Once they did, these children would 
have a right to demand special education supports and services and could 
also bring claims alleging that the school district failed to identify them 
within a reasonable amount of time. The school district wisely chose to 
                                                     
297.  Class Action Complaint at 7, D.R., No. 16-13694, (Oct. 18, 2016).  
298. Id. at 1. 
299. D.R., 2017 WL 4348818, at *1. 
300. Preliminary Settlement Agreement at 4–7, D.R., 2017 WL 4348818 (Apr. 9, 2018) (No. 16-
13694), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/ED-MI-0007-0006.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z7SC-D28W]. 
301. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 25, D.R., No. 16-
13694, (Nov. 17, 2017). 
302. Michigan agreed to fund developmental screenings and comprehensive special education 
evaluations for thousands of children exposed to lead in public drinking water. The state will create a 
registry system where families can choose to enroll their children for the initial screening. Further 
assessments, including neuropsychological tests, will be conducted where needed. Settlement 
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get out ahead of these claims by shoring up their identification process in 
order to both find the children suffering the impacts of lead exposure and 
design appropriate interventions and supports to meet their needs. 
Significant differences exist between disability eligibility based on lead 
exposure as compared to ACEs. Lead poisoning is specifically listed as an 
example of an acute health problem that could meet the IDEA’s OHI 
disability definition.303 ACEs are not. Moreover, the effects of exposure to 
lead as compared to ACEs differ dramatically.304 Yet, these differences do 
not preclude the viability of similar claims based on a theory of ACEs. 
ACEs can be likened to environmental “toxins” that, just like lead, have the 
potential to negatively impact learning.305 By virtue of exposure to ACEs 
alone, children increase their risk of negative health outcomes.306 
Importantly, just like the lead-exposed children, it is impossible to predict 
in advance how ACEs will impact any individual child or even whether all 
children with ACEs will be adversely affected. Demanding that schools 
account for this reality by implementing effective ACEs screening tools 
ensures that those students who need services are provided them and helps 
guard against over-identification risks. Ensuring effective screening tools 
will also help schools gather additional helpful student-specific information 
to determine when more comprehensive evaluations might be required.307 
Accounting for the differences between ACEs and lead, a successful 
ACEs litigation strategy must be grounded in the Section 504 child find 
obligation, given the law’s broader eligibility parameters.308 Further, 
                                                     
303. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(9)(i) (2019). 
304. Lanphear et al., supra note 296, at 894; cf. Effects, supra note 63. 
305. One significant difference between lead and ACEs is that no known antidote exists to lessen 
the impact of lead exposure for children. However, children may have varying levels of resiliency 
including stabilizing adult relationships, that can lessen the impact of exposure to ACEs. Treatment 
of Lead Poisoning, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, https://www.aap.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-
health-initiatives/lead-exposure/Pages/Treatment-of-Lead-Poisoning.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZJ98-
95VY] (finding that the primary treatment for lead poisoning is eliminating the source of lead 
exposure).  
306. See supra section I.A. 
307. Universal screenings may help identify when a child should be referred for comprehensive 
evaluation under the IDEA or Section 504 and the ADA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)–(c) (2018); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 104.35(b). In some cases, the IDEA evaluation process may provide a school district with 
information necessary to determine eligibility under Section 504 and the ADA. PARENT & EDUCATOR 
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 162, at 42. ACEs-related universal screening tools exist and can help 
distinguish which students require further interventions due to impacts of trauma. Complex Trauma 
Standardized Measures, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, 
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/complex-trauma-standardized-measures [https://perma.cc/2AFL-
4DES]; see also EKLUND & ROSSEN, supra note 166 (discussing the benefits of implementing 
universal screenings as an essential component of multi-tiered systems of support). 
308. See supra section II.B. Notably, lead poisoning, unlike ACEs, is explicitly listed under the 
IDEA’s “other health impairment” disability category. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(9)(i). 
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because exposure to ACEs presents a more tenuous path to a potential 
need for educational supports, litigants would be better served by bringing 
a series of individual child find claims on behalf of children who clearly 
evidenced the impacts of ACEs as evidenced by learning or behavioral 
challenges. A series of successful claims would pressure a school district 
to adopt improved child find procedures, including universal screenings 
for ACEs related impacts. Just as in the Flint settlement, universal 
screenings may trigger more comprehensive evaluations when needed.309 
Improved child find procedures, beginning with universal screenings, 
may uncover an overwhelming need for mental health counseling for a 
large swath of students in a school district such as Compton—with 
attendant incidents of poverty and community violence. If so, the final 
result of an improved screening and evaluation process in a school district 
serving a community of students with a high incidence of ACEs may be 
the same remedy that the Compton complaint demands. An individualized 
screening process that identifies some critical mass of students as 
requiring mental health services (as well as instruction targeted at building 
social emotional skills) would likely force a district to adopt schoolwide 
programmatic reforms. The difference between this Article’s strategy and 
that of the Compton plaintiffs is that the school district would elect to 
provide those services based on administrative and fiscal efficiencies. 
They would rely on the data they begin to develop about their student 
population’s collective needs, not just succumb to assumptions. They may 
also engage in the regular democratic process to make broader policy 
changes and by doing so, may solicit community feedback. 
A potential avenue for a class-based child find remedy exists through 
the IDEA, but it only tangentially centers on ACEs. It would require a 
putative class to marshal statistical evidence of a school district’s failure 
to identify students with disabilities as compared to other similarly 
situated districts. A class of former preschool-aged children successfully 
brought such a claim in the District of Columbia.310 There, plaintiffs 
successfully argued that the school district was failing to identify students 
with disabilities using national rates of special education enrollment and 
expert testimony regarding risk factors unique to District of Columbia.311 
Such a claim is based on risks inherent to impoverished urban 
jurisdictions.312 Exposure to ACEs may be included as an additional risk 
                                                     
309. 34 C.F.R. § 104.35. 
310. D.L. v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
311. Id. at 720.  
312. Id. at 728. In D.L., the District court imposed an 8.5% identification benchmark finding that: 
although ‘nationally, about six percent of three-to-five-year-olds are identified with 
developmental delays,’ the number is likely higher in the District because of its unique risk 
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facing children in such environments. The remedy here, like in the 
individual claims, is to shore up a school’s child find procedure so that 
children who do need supports are provided them. 
B. Creating Federal Grants to Address System-Wide Supports 
 A second solution involves congressional action in the form of 
federal and state grants targeting schoolwide needs brought on by serving 
a large population of students impacted by ACEs. Of course, this solution 
requires prevailing upon federal and state legislators to direct grant 
funding towards communities impacted by ACEs. Once funds were 
allocated, school districts could apply for grants upon a showing that their 
student population met a threshold percentage of ACEs-impacted students. 
Funding could be used to implement schoolwide training for teachers, mental 
health counseling, and other evidence-based interventions that have proven 
effective in addressing the impacts of ACEs. 
The benefits of establishing such grants are clear and compelling. By 
requiring a threshold percentage of ACEs-impacted students, grants 
would incentivize school districts to establish solid procedures for the 
identification of students impacted by ACEs and to be proactive in their 
attempts to address this population’s collective needs. Further, facilitating 
grants supports a grassroots approach, encouraging communities to identify 
their particular needs and the resources that would best meet those needs. 
Critics may caution that such grants could incentivize over-
identification of students impacted by ACEs.313 While this raises a 
legitimate concern, grants would not need to be tied to disability 
identification, but rather, could be tied to data gathered in universal 
screening tools. Grants may be awarded to schools who can demonstrate 
that a certain percentage of their student population has experienced four 
or more ACEs, regardless of whether or not those students could qualify 
as “individuals with disabilities.” While compelling legislative action will 
undoubtedly be challenging, there are at least two reasons to suggest this 
may prove a viable path forward. First, ACEs have emerged as a pressing 
national issue gaining grassroots momentum in recent years, making it 
ripe for aggressive lobbying efforts and legislative action. Second, 
                                                     
factors, including unusually high rates of poverty, child homelessness, single-parent and non-
English-speaking households, incidence of low birthweight and HIV/AIDS infection, and 
participation in supplemental assistance programs. 
Id.  
313. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: 
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for 
Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 412 (2001) (“Although African Americans 
appear to bear the brunt of over-identification, the evidence indicates that all minority groups are 
vulnerable to discrimination in identification for special education.”). 
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successful models of competitive grants for targeted educational 
improvements already exist, marking a clear path forward for similar 
grants addressing ACEs.314 
Over the last decade, a concerted grassroots movement to educate 
schools and parents about ACEs has taken considerable hold.315 A 
significant uptick in both state and federal ACEs-related legislation is 
irrefutable.316 Many of these proposed bills, particularly at the federal 
level, have focused on addressing trauma through health care systems 
rather than schools.317 Notably, Illinois recently passed legislation that 
would mandate schoolwide social emotional screening as part of every 
child’s regular school enrollment.318 As grassroots movements around 
ACEs continue to grow, advocacy groups can lobby for financial support 
at local, state, and federal levels that is targeted at remediating the effects 
of ACEs in schools. While universal screening is an excellent first step, 
schools will need additional dollars to implement training and offer 
comprehensive mental health supports to fully address student needs.319 
In many ways, the groundwork has already been laid for these efforts.320 
Moreover, several education-based grant programs serve as successful 
models of funding streams targeted at addressing unmet needs of specific 
cohorts of students. A successful federal program could be created 
                                                     
314. Office of Special Educ. Programs, DISCRETIONARY GRANTS DATABASE 
https://publicddb.osepideasthatwork.org/ [https://perma.cc/74L8-SL4D] [hereinafter 
DISCRETIONARY GRANTS DATABASE]. 
315. Alexandra Maul, State and Federal Support of Trauma-Informed Care: Sustaining the 
Momentum, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.chcs.org/state-
federal-support-trauma-informed-care-sustaining-momentum/ [https://perma.cc/ZH5G-FGFH] 
(referencing almost forty bills in eighteen states that were submitted to legislatures in 2017). The bills 
instituted a variety of practices including ACEs screenings, trainings, and interdisciplinary 
collaboration between healthcare, education, child welfare, and behavioral health providers. Id.   
316. Id.; see also Jonathan Purtle & Michael Lewis, Mapping “Trauma-Informed” Legislative 
Proposals in U.S. Congress, 44 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. RES. 867, 870 (2017) 
(finding that forty-nine bills were introduced in U.S. Congress that used trauma-informed language). 
317. The Trauma-Informed Care for Children and Families Act of 2017 was introduced in Congress 
in December 2016 and aims to increase understanding and awareness of trauma and identify best 
practices for prevention and treatment. S.774, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017–2018).  
318. Ill. S.B. 565, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017).  
319. EKLUND & ROSSEN, supra note 166, at 8–9 (discussing the benefits of implementing universal 
screenings as an essential component of multi-tiered systems of support). 
320. Massachusetts enacted a state law that provides grant funding to develop trauma-sensitive 
schools. Initially, the law provided grants to schools interested in developing the infrastructure for 
teacher training, counseling and other classroom accommodations to support the “psycho-social needs 
of children whose behavior interferes with learning, particularly those who are suffering from the 
traumatic effects of exposure to violence.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69 § 1N (2016). A second law was 
passed to impose standards on trauma identification and appropriate accommodations. Id., ch. 69 
§ 1P. 
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through discretionary grants, a competitive application process 
administered through the Department of Education, or through set- aside 
funding provided through the IDEA. The U.S. Department of Education 
already facilitates the distribution of several targeted discretionary grants, 
including funds targeted at training for bilingual teachers, implementation 
of schoolwide positive behavioral interventions and supports, and 
developing effective partnerships between schools and mental health 
systems.321 The Office of Special Education Programs also facilitates 
discretionary grants to meet discrete needs within the special education 
community and funds programs specific to the development of trauma-
informed practices.322 Another funding stream could be dedicated through 
the use of a portion of money already allocated to states through the IDEA. 
This would require amending the IDEA, but such amendments have been 
successful in the past. In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to include a 
provision for the permissive use of funds directed at early intervening 
services.323 The point was to target funds and, consequently, services 
towards students who were struggling academically or behaviorally, but 
who were not yet identified as eligible students with disabilities.324 
Similarly, IDEA funds could be directed to benefit students impacted by 
ACEs who require interventions to address behavioral or academic 
challenges, but who may not be eligible as students with disabilities under 
the law. 
The focus on creating funding streams for grant-based programs to 
address the impacts of ACEs is not without its challenges. It will require 
effective lobbying and advocacy to convince legislators to direct funding 
to this cause. Even if passed, school leaders would have to apply for such 
funding. Many school leaders and districts are already overwhelmed with 
the number of grant and IDEA reporting requirements that are necessary 
for existing school programs. However, if research around ACEs is 
correct, the problem is widespread and touches many communities at a 
fundamental level. For some communities, school-based supports may be 
the most effective tool to improve not only academic outcomes, but also 
ensure a greater chance of long-term success outside of the classroom. As 
the evidence-based practices to help stem the tide of ACEs become more 
                                                     
321. Forecast of Funding Opportunities Under the Department of Education Discretionary Grant 
Programs for Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/fund/grant/find/edlite-
forecast.html [https://perma.cc/3JMK-H9M6]. 
322. DISCRETIONARY GRANTS DATABASE, supra note 314. 
323. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(f) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.226 (2019) (permitting school districts to use up 
to 15% of funds it receives through IDEA’s Part B formula grant to provide early intervening services 
to children who are struggling academically or behaviorally but are as yet, unidentified). 
324. 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,626–28 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300–301). 
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effective and prominent, the desire to implement them should only 
increase.325 If so, the resources—not the resolution—to implement them 
will be most crucial. 
CONCLUSION 
Children living in communities plagued by drug epidemics, marred by 
violence, and devoid of economic development are, undoubtedly, affected 
by their environments. Quite clearly, these children face an uphill battle 
for educational success and have largely been left to fight it alone. 
Advocates should be commended for shining a light on these inequities 
and for their attempt to bring immediate remedies to ACEs-impacted 
students. The breadth of this problem requires both immediate and large-
scale solutions. But distorting disability rights laws in an effort to create 
systemic remedies is both unfeasible and potentially harmful. 
An effective solution demands a more nuanced legal strategy and the 
tenacity to engage lawmakers. Advocates should harness the power of 
individual students’ viable claims to pressure schools for universal ACEs 
screenings. Screenings will sort children impacted by ACEs from those 
who are not and serve as the gatekeeper to the services that students with 
disabilities so desperately need. With actual knowledge of disabilities, 
schools are obligated to target services at individualized needs. And if 
aggregate data revealed the need for schoolwide interventions, schools 
could go one step further and implement them. 
Given the scope of need in these schools and the limited resources they 
have to meet them, existing law alone may not be enough to secure 
effective remedies. Advocates must also channel the grassroots 
momentum around ACEs awareness to lobby state and federal legislatures 
for targeted funds. These funds could be used to implement school-wide 
programs that do not involve disability determinations, thus averting the 
potential for over identification of students as disabled. Legislative reform 
is never easy, but the science evidencing the impacts of ACEs is 
undeniable. Schools and lawmakers either leave students to confront these 
weighty challenges on their own, or they can act now to provide students 
with supports that make a meaningful difference. 
 
                                                     
325. CTR. ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD AT HARVARD UNIV., FROM BEST PRACTICES TO 
BREAKTHROUGH IMPACTS 19 (2016), https://46y5eh11fhgw3ve3ytpwxt9r-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/From_Best_Practices_to_Breakthrough_Impacts-4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AR9L-KSP8]. 
